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ABSTRACT  
Thirty years after it has achieved its independence, the Republic of Chad, which has faced a 
long political instability, decided to exploit its oil resources in order to achieve its 
development objectives. Owing to the difficulties encountered in mobilizing financial 
resources for the realization of the project, the Government obtained from the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) a loan US$39.5 millions. 
The loan Agreement, signed between the two parties on the 29th of March 2001 included a 
provision referring to the Petroleum Revenue Management Program (PRMP), described in 
Schedule 5 of the Agreement. This Petroleum Revenue Management Program imposed a 
number of obligations, related to the actions to be undertaken by the Chadian Government 
prior to the release of the funds by the Bank, and to the modalities to be followed in the 
course of the management of the oil revenues. These obligations are also known as 
governance conditionalities. 
This thesis raises the issues of the legitimacy of the Bank’s Governance conditionality, its 
impact on both the sovereignty of the borrower to freely determine the use of its resources 
and the effectiveness of the loan.  
 It argues that the definition of the Bank’s governance agenda do not necessarily consider the 
preoccupations of the borrowers. This thesis also argues that the implementation of loan 
including a governance conditionality component does consider the borrower autonomy to 
amend the Bank’s reforms policies so as to adapt them to its preoccupations and new 
changes. This situation, which is aggravated by the lack of an independent and strong 
monitoring and dispute settlement mechanism in the Bank’s model, affects the effectiveness 
of the loan.  
This thesis ends on recommendations aiming at enhancing the effectiveness of the Bank’s 
lending programs while safeguarding the sovereignty of borrower. These are the adoption of 
principles applicable to the Bank’s lending activities, the transformation of the inspection 
panel into an independent monitoring and dispute settlement mechanism and the adoption of 
a new mode of representation of borrowing countries within the World Bank’s governance 
bodies.  
 iii
  
 
 
DECLARATION 
 
 
I declare that World Bank Governance Conditionality, Sovereignty of Borrowing States and 
Effectiveness of Investment Loans: An Analysis of the Chad-IBRD Loan Agreement is my 
own work, that it has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in any other 
University, and that all the sources I have used or quoted have been indicated and 
acknowledged as complete references. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
              Jean Bertrand Azapmo                                                                             May 2007 
 
Signed………………………….. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iv
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 
 
First and foremost, I would like to thank God for all He makes in my life. 
Secondly, I would like to thank the World Bank which sponsors this LLM Program, for 
affording me a chance at my dreams through this scholarship. 
I would also like express my gratitude to the Cameroonian Ministry of External Relations, 
my employer, for authorizing my participation in this program. 
 
 
Specials thanks go Adv. Ms Riekie Wandrag my Supervisor, and Dr Jim Mathis my Co-
Supervisor, for their tireless efforts in supervising and guiding me, from the time of the 
research proposal to accomplishing the thesis. 
 
I would like to extend my gratitude to my lecturers, notably Ms Patricia Lenaghan for her 
support and Robert Wilson for his observations. 
   
Thanks to Enga Kameni, Mbong Madgeline and Jimcall Pfumuroze for their comments.  
 
To my classmates at the University of the Western Cape, you will always be remembered. 
 
My sincere gratitude goes to my mother Louise Menatio for her support throughout my 
studies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 v
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
 
Art:              Article 
CAEMC:     Central African Economic and Monetary Community 
Franc CFA: Franc de la Communauté Financière Africaine 
G24:           Informal Working Group within the World Bank constituted of 24 countries from 
the three regions of Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Asia 
GDP:         Gross Domestic Product 
HDR:         Human Development Report 
IAG:           International Advisory Group  
IBRD         International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
ICP:            IDA Country’s Performance  
ICSID:        International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Dispute  
IFIs:         International Financial Institutions 
IMF:         International Monetary Fund  
NEPAD  New Partnership for African Development  
NGOs  Non Governmental Organizations 
Parag  Paragraph 
PRMP  Petroleum Revenue Management Program 
Sec  Section 
UN  United Nations  
UNDP  United Nations Development Program 
WTO  World Trade Organization 
 
 
 
 
 
 vi
LIST OF TABLES 
 
 
 
Table Title Page
Table1 Governance Conditionalities included in the Chad-IBRD Loan Agreement 21 
Table2  Overview of the evolution of selected Human Development Indicators in 
Chad between 2003 and 2006 
27 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENT 
 
 
KEY WORDS............................................................................................................................ii 
ABSTRACT............................................................................................................................. iii 
DECLARATION ......................................................................................................................iv 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.......................................................................................................v 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS .................................................................vi 
LIST OF TABLES...................................................................................................................vii 
CHAPTER 1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION...................................................................1 
1.1 BACKGROUND---------------------------------------------------------------------------------1 
1.2  STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM ----------------------------------------------------------2 
1.3 SIGNIFICANCE AND OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH ----------------------------2 
1.3.1 SIGNIFICANCE................................................................................................2 
1.3.2 OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH ...............................................................3 
1.4 DEFINITIONS AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY --------------------------------------------4 
1.4.1 DEFINITIONS...................................................................................................4 
A International Loan Agreement. ..............................................................................4 
B Conditionalities ......................................................................................................4 
C Governance ............................................................................................................4 
D Governance Conditionality ....................................................................................5 
E Sovereignty ............................................................................................................5 
1.4.2 SCOPE OF THE STUDY..................................................................................5 
1.5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK -------------6 
1.5.1 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY..............................................................................6 
1.5.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK.....................................................................7 
1.6 HYPOTHESIS -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------7 
1.7 CHAPTERS REVIEW. -------------------------------------------------------------------------8 
CHAPTER 2 EVOLUTION OF THE WORLD BANK GOVERNANCE 
CONDITIONALITY ...............................................................................................................9 
2.1  INTRODUCTION ------------------------------------------------------------------------------9 
2.2 THE RISE AND SPREAD OF GOVERNANCE CONDITIONALITY IN THE 
WORLD BANK’S LENDING OPERATIONS.------------------------------------------------------9 
2.3 THE WORLD BANK’S OPERATIONALIZATION OF GOVERNANCE 
CONDITIONALITY ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 10 
2.4 LEGITIMACY OF THE WORLD BANK’S GOVERNANCE AGENDA------------ 12 
2.4.1  ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE BANK’S GOVERNANCE AGENDA -------------- 12 
2.4.2 ARGUMENTS FAVOURABLE TO THE WORLD BANK’S GOVERNANCE 
AGENDA. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 14 
2.4.3 ASSESSING THE ARGUMENTS ON THE LEGITIMACY OF THE WORLD 
BANK’S GOVERNANCE AGENDA--------------------------------------------------------------- 15 
 viii
2.5 CONCLUSION ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 16 
CHAPTER 3 THE WORLD BANK’S GOVERNANCE CONDITIONALITY IN 
THE CHAD –PIPELINE PROJECT-------------------------------------------------------------- 17 
3.1 INTRODUCTION---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 17 
3.2 CONTEXT OF THE CHAD PIPELINE PROJECT: AN UNSTABLE AND LEAST 
DEVELOPED COUNTRY---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 17 
3.3 WORLD BANK’S INVOLMENT IN THE CHAD PROJECT. ----------------------------- 18 
3.4 GOVERNANCE CONDITIONALITY IN CHAD IBRD- LOAN AGREEMENT. ------ 19 
3.4.1 CONTENT OF GOVERNANCE CONDITIONALITY------------------------------------ 20 
3.4 .2 ANALYSIS OF THE CONTENT OF GOVERNANCE CONDITIONALITY IN THE 
CHAD-IBRD AGREEMENT------------------------------------------------------------------------- 22 
A AN ASYMMETRICAL RELATIONASHIP BETWEEN THE BANK AND CHAD22 
B IMPACT OF THE IMBALANCE OF THE BANK’S GOVERNANCE 
STRUCTURE IN THE DEFINITION ON CONDITIONALITIES APPLICABLE TO A 
LOAN.---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 23 
3.5  CONCLUSION-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 25 
CHAPTER4 RELATIVE EFFECTIVENESS OF GOVERNANCE 
CONDITIONALITY IN THE CHAD PIPELINE PROJECT ------------------------------- 26 
4.1. INTRODUCTION--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 26 
4.2 OUTCOMES OF THE PROJECT --------------------------------------------------------------- 27 
4.3 LIMIT OF THE BANK’S GOVERNANCE APPROACH IN THE CHAD PROJECT -- 28 
4.3.1 SOCIAL AND INSTITUTIONAL SHORTCOMINGS OF THE PROEJECT---------- 28 
4.3.2 THE RIGIDITY OF THE BANK’S MODEL AND TENSION WITH THE 
ECONOMIC SOVEREIGNTY OF CHAD.--------------------------------------------------------- 29 
4.3.3 LACK OF A NEUTRAL ASSESSMENT AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
MECHANISMS----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 31 
4.4 CONCLUSION ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 33 
CHAPTER 5 REFORM OF THE WORLD BANK APPROACH TO 
GOVERNANCE CONDITIONALITY.----------------------------------------------------------- 34 
5.1 INTRODUCTION---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 34 
5.2 AMENDING THE BANK’S ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT------------------------------- 34 
5.3 REFORMING THE WORLD BANK'S GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE ----------------- 35 
5.3.1 INCREASING THE REPRESENTATION OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WITHIN 
THE EXECUTIVE BOARD -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 35 
 ix
5.3.2 INSTITUTIONALIZING THE PARTICIPATION OF NON-STATE ACTORS IN 
THE MEETINGS OF THE EXECUTIVE BOARD ----------------------------------------------- 36 
5.4 IMPROVING THE MODUS OPERANDI OF THE WORLD BANK.--------------------- 37 
5.4.1 FROM CONDITIONALITY TO SELECTIVITY------------------------------------------- 37 
5.4.2 STRENGTHENING OF THE BORROWER’S OWNERSHIP --------------------------- 38 
5.4.3 ADOPTING A STRONG MONITORING MECHANISM. ------------------------------- 39 
5.5 ASSESSING THE EXISTING PROPOSALS ------------------------------------------------- 40 
5.6 CONCLUSION ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 42 
CHAPTER 6 RECOMMENDATIONS...........................................................................44 
6.1 INTRODUCTION---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 44 
6.2 ADOPTION OF PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO THE BANK’S LOAN AND 
GRANTS. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 44 
6.3  TRANSFORMING THE INSPECTION PANEL INTO AN INDEPENDENT 
MONITORING AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISM. ----------------------------- 46 
6.4 IMPROVING THE REPRESENTATION OF BORROWING COUNTRIES TO THE 
EXECUTIVE BOARD MEETING AFECTING THEM. ----------------------------------------- 47 
6.6 POTENTIAL BENEFITS AND COST ATTACHED TO THE 
RECOMMENDATIONS ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 47 
6.6.1 POTENTIAL BENEFITS----------------------------------------------------------------------- 47 
6.6.2 PROSPECTIVE COSTS ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 48 
6.7 GENERAL CONCLUSION ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 49 
BIBLIOGRAPHY....................................................................................................................51 
A BOOKS------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 51 
B THESIS------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 52 
C JOURNAL ARTICLES ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 52 
D CHAPTERS IN BOOKS---------------------------------------------------------------------- 54 
E. OTHERS PAPERS ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 55 
F. REPORTS--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 58 
G.        LEGALS DOCUMENTS --------------------------------------------------------------------- 60 
H. WEB SITES ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 60 
ANNEX 1.................................................................................................................................61 
SCHEDULE 5of the Chad-IBRD loan Agreement .................................................................61 
Petroleum Revenue Management Program .............................................................................61 
 
 
 
 x
CHAPTER 1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
The severe debt crisis which has faced most developing countries since the early 1980’s has 
led a number of international financial institutions to review their strategies. New programs 
were launched including structural adjustment programs, sectoral adjustment programs, 
structural adjustment facilities and enhanced adjustment facilities.1
Despite their originality, these programs did not lead to the expected results and were even 
counterproductive in some countries.2 It therefore became urgent to develop new policies, 
also known as post Washington Consensus reforms.3
The World Bank4 came up with a new ingredient named governance conditionality.5 Defined 
by the Bank as the ‘manner, in which authority is exercised in the management of a country's 
economic and social resources for development’6 governance conditionality encompasses the 
capacity of governments to design, formulate and implement policies.  
However, the new approach also appeared to be inappropriate as solution to the problem of 
the ineffectiveness of international assistance.7 One of the explanations of this failure was 
that the new programs severely undermined the autonomy and sovereignty of recipient 
                                                 
1 These programs culminated at the time of the wide consensus amongst the Washington based-institutions 
(International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the US Treasury Department) on a number of necessary 
policy reforms to be implemented by developing countries to overcome their difficulties: fiscal discipline, 
redirection of public expenditure priorities towards health, education and infrastructure, tax reform, 
unified/competitive exchange rate, secure property rights, deregulation, trade liberalization, privatization, 
promoting foreign direct investment and finance liberalization, from 
<www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Washington_Consensus>  [accessed on 23 September 2006] 
2 Ahrens (2002) 27. 
3 Clayton (1994) 36. 
4 The use of the terms World Bank or the Bank throughout this paper refers to the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), one of the five institutions of the World Bank Group which granted 
an investment loan to Chad to finance the construction of its pipeline project.  
5 The IMF has adopted a similar approach with what is known as structural conditionality. 
6 The World Bank (1994) 58 quoted by Schlemmer-Schulte, S (2001) 697 and Santiso, C (2002) 4.
7 A study by a former Bank vice president (Willi Wapenhans) found that a high proportion of World Bank 
projects (37.5% in 1991) did not satisfy minimum economic targets, and were not meeting the Bank's own 
criteria. See World Bank (1992). Effectiveness implementation: Key to development impact (The Wapenhans 
Report). Washington, D.C; see also the Meltzer Report available at http://www.house.gov/jec/imf/meltzer.htm 
[accessed on March 27th 2007] 
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countries. It became clear that only reform programs fully owned by Borrowers are most 
likely to be effective.8 In order words, using order and command as a modality of regulating 
and promoting good governance was most likely to be inefficient and counterproductive.  
1.2  STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
The research question which arises from the above dilemma is formulated as follow: How to 
balance the World Bank’s governance agenda and the sovereignty of borrowing countries, so 
as to improve the effectiveness of the Bank’s lending programs? 
1.3 SIGNIFICANCE AND OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH 
1.3.1 SIGNIFICANCE 
Two considerations are attached to this research: 
First, although the World Bank is a development institution, it is driven in its lending 
operations by the need to overcome the moral hazard problem (coupled with that of risk) that 
exists in a relationship between an investor (the Principal) and the manager (Agent) .9 Driven 
by the principal-agent model,10 the Bank is inclined to request specific commitments from 
borrowers so as to know exactly how the funds released will be utilized.  
Secondly, Art III, sec. 5(b) of the World Bank’s Articles of Agreement prevents it from 
political or other non-economic influences or consideration in its activities. 11 Therefore, the 
issue is whether the Bank can resort to governance as a conditionality of its lending programs 
                                                 
8 Chandler (2005) 22sqq, WOOD (2005) 9.   
9 One of the fundamental features of this model is the asymmetry of information between the two actors, which 
creates an imbalance in the bargaining of power in the course of the negotiation process. See Richard (2004) 
from <www.bath.ac.uk/management/research/pdf/2004-08.pdf> [accessed on 27 October 2006]. 
10 This model provides a solution to overcome the moral hazard problem and suggests that the manager should 
get not only all the necessary information, but also to obtain express commitment from the investor, so as to be 
in a good position when it decides to grant a loan. In the case of World Bank lending operations, the incentives 
take the form of preconditions, Benchmarks or Triggers.  
11 Art III, sec. 5(b) of the Article of Agreements of the IBRD provides: ‘The Bank shall make arrangements to 
ensure that the proceeds of any loan are used only for the purposes for which the loan was granted, with due 
attention to considerations of economy and efficiency and without regard to political or other non-economic 
influences or considerations.’  See also art IV, sec 10; art. V, sec. 5(c)                             
<siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTABOUTUS/Resources/ibrd-articlesofagreement.pdf> [accessed on 23 
September 2006]. See also Brucculeri (2004) 69. 
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without violating its own Articles of Agreement as well as some outstanding principles of 
international law.12  
1.3.2 OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH 
The general objective of this paper is to come up with a model reconciling the Bank’s 
concern about the effectiveness of its lending operations and the sovereignty of the borrower 
over its economic programs. 
Specific objectives attached to this research include: 
• To present the evolution and current trend of the World Bank’s approach to 
governance conditionality, and its implementation in the case of the investment loan 
agreement between Chad and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(IBRD);13 
• To examine the legal implications of governance conditionality on the sovereignty of 
the borrower and the hierarchy of  international norms; 
• To critically analyze the proposals made so far to reform the Bank’s governance 
approach; 
• To put forward some recommendations to Bank’s governance agenda and the 
sovereignty of borrowers. 
The objectives having been presented, the next point to develop is the definition of the main 
concepts and the scope of the study.14
                                                 
12 Attention will be paid to the principles of the sovereignty of State and that of the hierarchy among norms of 
international law. 
13 Throughout this paper, this Agreement will be referred to as the Chad-IBRD loan Agreement. 
14 One shall however admit that there is no unanimity about the definition and content of conditionality, nor that 
of governance Checkel (2000) from <www.arena.uio.no/publications/working-papers2000/papers/00_18.xml> 
[accessed on 17 March 2007]. 
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1.4 DEFINITIONS AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
1.4.1 DEFINITIONS 
A International Loan Agreement  
It is a contractual arrangement between a minimum of two actors of international relations, 
through which one party (Lender) undertakes to allow the use of money under the obligation 
for the other party (Borrower) to return it on specified terms at a future date.15  
B Conditionalities 
 According to the World Bank, the term conditionalities refers to the policy reforms that a 
borrowing Government is required to undertake in exchange of specified amounts of 
assistance.16  
C Governance 
Despite the lack of unity over the definition of the concept governance,17 it is described by 
the Bank as the manner in which authority is exercised in the management of a country's 
economic and social resources for development.’18
                                                 
15 See Qureshi (1999) 195, Head (1996) 214. This conception of a loan is well established in the jurisprudence 
of the ICJ, Certain Norwegian Loans, Judgment of 6 July 1957. Summary from <www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idecisions/isummaries/ifnsummary570706.htm> [accessed on 23 March 2007]. 
16 World Bank (2005) iii. 
17 As Wood (2005) 4 rightly suggested, the concept of governance is relatively new in international development 
and its definition vary widely among development actors. For the World Bank Institute  ‘Governance is defined 
as the exercise of authority through formal and informal traditions and institutions for the common good, thus 
encompassing: (1) the process of selecting, monitoring, and replacing governments; (2) the capacity to 
formulate and implement sound policies and deliver public services, and (3) the respect of citizens and the state 
for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them’  Kaufman (2003) 5 available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWBIGOVANTCOR/Resources/rethink_gov_stanford.pdf [accessed 27 
September 2006]. For the UNDP (2006) 35, ‘any definition of governance must relate government to the society 
as a whole, in terms of its quality and functions. Governance comprises the traditions, institutions and processes 
that determine how power is exercised, how citizens acquire a voice and how decisions are made on issues of 
public concern.’ The Institute on Governance (2006) 4 defines it as ‘the process whereby societies or 
organizations make important decisions, determine whom they involve and how they render account’.  
18 The World Bank (1994) 58 quoted by Schlemmer-Schulte Opcit 697 and Santiso Opcit 4. 
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D Governance Conditionality 
Chakravarthi Raghavan defines it as the practice developed in the earlier 1990s by 
International Financial Institutions and which consists in linking aid to political and economic 
policy reforms.19   
E Sovereignty   
As a distinguishing feature of modern politics,20 sovereignty is the supremacy right that a 
State is recognized in International Law over its domestic and external affairs, without any 
foreign interference. This includes inter allia the right to determine its own policies and 
development course.21
1.4.2 SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
This paper focuses mainly on the Chad-IBRD Investment Loan Agreement for the 
construction of the Chad pipeline project. It has been chosen because it is one of the most 
important projects funded by the World Bank in Sub-Saharan Africa over the last decade.22  
Governance conditionality in this research refers to the reforms included in the Petroleum 
Revenue Management Program, described in Schedule 5 of the Chad-IBRD Loan Agreement, 
and implemented over the period March 29, 2000, (date of the conclusion of the Loan 
Agreement) July 13, 2006 (date to which a new Memorandum of Understanding was signed 
between the two parties).  
The next step is the presentation of the research methodology and the theoretical framework. 
                                                 
19 Chakravarthi Raghavan (1997) http://www.sunsonline.org/trade/areas/finance/03240097.htm  [accessed on 
September 27th 2006]  
20 Jackson (1999) 1. 
21 Tsai (2000) 1318; Athena  (2000) 53. 
22 Bank Information Centre, BIC discusses Chad oil Pipeline on NPR: Collapse of Bank’s “model” project 
offers lessons and exposes risks to the poor. From <www.bicusa.org/en/article/2668aspx> [accessed on 17 
October 2006]. Nevertheless, reference to other countries has been necessary to understand and compare the 
World Bank approach. Cameroon was considered because of the existence of a similar investment loan 
agreement with the IBRD for the realization of the same pipeline project. 
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1.5   RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK 
1.5.1 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Concerning the collection of data, this research was done by reviewing the literature, from 
which were derived social artifacts, especially structured data from reports, legal documents, 
books and journal articles.  
Resort was also made to statistics derived from Reports from the World Bank, the UNDP and 
the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CAEMC).23 This paper also looks 
at the perceptions and views of stakeholders involved in the pipeline project, including 
Government’s officials, NGOs and Monitoring Institutions.24  
With regard to the methodological tools of analyzing data, the historical approach was chosen 
in the first place, because history reveals the evolution and changes within Institutions, and 
provides a good understanding of past and current behaviors of different actors. 
In the second place, the content analysis was used for the documents including the Chad-
IBRD loan agreement, some key provisions of both the Bank’s Articles of Agreement and the 
Agreement between the Bank and the United Nations.25  
Thirdly the correlation technique was used to appreciate the impact of the use of governance 
conditionality on the effectiveness of the Chad-IBRD loan agreement.26 Thus, a set of criteria 
was constructed, based on both the UNDP Human Development Indicators and the Bank’s 
governance indicators derived from the loan agreement. 
                                                 
23  Preference was given to the Reports issued between 1999 and 2006.  
24 The reports of the Inspection Panel, the International Advisory Group, the Oil Control and Monitoring Group 
were of great importance. See Chapter 4 herein. 
25 The content analysis technique was combined with the comparative approach, in order to appreciate the 
differences in the Bank approach when dealing with different countries of different level of development. 
Preference was given to Cameroon manly because of the reason mentioned in the delineation of the scope of the 
study. 
26 Thus, a set of criteria was constructed, based on both the UNDP Human Development Indicators and the 
Bank’s governance indicators derived from the loan agreement. 
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Finally for the recommendations, the decision tree model was purposely chosen for this is a 
predictive model aiming at mapping observations about an item to conclusions about the 
item's target value.27 Henceforth the reform’s proposals present a model which is most likely 
to reach the goal of development pursued by the World Bank, while leaving flexibilities to 
borrowers. 
1.5.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The main theory used to address the issues raised in this paper is the game theory.28 This 
theory considers international negotiations as a game during which each player seeks to 
maximize its benefits while minimizing the adverse effect of the decisions. Henceforth, for 
the game to result in a win-win game rather than a zero sum game, it is suggested that 
international economic and financial negotiations be based on integrative strategies. These 
strategies include: ‘efforts to discover the real nature of the issues, joint research of potential, 
trading of positions and no ruling out of concessions ab initio.’29  
Applying this theory to the negotiation of international loan agreement leads to the 
conclusion that lender and borrower should consider the interests of each another, and 
associate them to all the stage of the process (agenda-setting, adoption of agreement and 
implementation).  
It is therefore assumed that any negotiation of international loan agreement that excludes one 
of the borrower or during which one of the borrower does not fully participate, or plays little 
role in the definition and adoption of the reforms attached to the loan will be hardly 
implemented and therefore will be less effective. 
1.6  HYPOTHESIS 
Making use of the research methodology and relying on the theory underlined above, the 
hypothesis of this paper is stated as follow: The setting up process, the nature, and the 
assessment mechanism of the World Bank’s governance conditionality should be reformed in 
order to balance the sovereignty of the borrower and the concern of the effectiveness of loans. 
                                                 
27From <en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Decision_tree> [accessed on 27 October 2006]. 
28 Bayne and Woolcock (2003) 33seqq.  
29 Ibid 39 
 7
In order to test this hypothesis, the following assumptions were made: 
• The composition of the World Bank’s governance structure and decision making 
process leading to the definition of the Bank’s governance package is detrimental to 
borrowers; 
• The implementation of a loan with a governance conditionality component 
undermines the borrower sovereignty to freely amend the programs. 
• The existing assessment mechanism is fully controlled by the Bank and does not 
cover the case of dispute settlement. 
1.7  CHAPTERS REVIEW. 
Chapter 1 of this paper deals with the Introduction. The evolution and legitimacy of the 
Bank’s governance conditionality are traced in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 starts with a historical 
and socio- economical background of Chad, and focuses mainly on governance conditionality 
as implemented in the Chad Project. Chapter 4 examines the relative effectiveness of the 
Chad Project; meanwhile Chapter 5 critically assesses the proposals made for the reform of 
the Bank’s Governance Conditionality. The recommendations aiming at improving the 
Bank’s governance structure, the assessment and dispute settlement mechanism as well as the 
content of Governance package, are dealt with in Chapter 6. The paper ends up with a 
conclusion. 
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CHAPTER 2 EVOLUTION OF THE WORLD BANK 
GOVERNANCE CONDITIONALITY 
2.1  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the dynamic of the World Bank’s governance conditionality and its 
operationalization. It goes further to discuss the legitimacy of such a new agenda. 
2.2  THE RISE AND SPREAD OF GOVERNANCE 
CONDITIONALITY IN THE WORLD BANK’S LENDING 
OPERATIONS. 
Although the use of conditionality in the World Bank’s lending operations has been debated 
already since the Bretton Woods conference, its practice is recent, especially in investment 
loans.30 In the early years of its functioning, the Bank acted like a commercial enterprise and 
did not favour conditionality in its loans.31 Its role was restricted by Art III, sec.1 (a) of its 
Article of Agreement to finance projects submitted by members.32  
Historically, the use of conditionality in lending operations is traced in the early 1980s after 
the economic crisis of the end of 1970s, with the introduction of structural adjustment loans 
and sectoral adjustment loans.33 However, the new prescriptions did not meet the predictable 
outcomes, nor did they lead to substantial development in borrowing countries, as highlighted 
                                                 
30 During this conference, the Great Britain delegation lead by Lord John Maynard Keynes favoured a liberal 
regime of access to the funds of the Bank, meanwhile the US delegation lead by Harry Dexter White shared the 
view that ‘the Fund’s resources were to be conserved for the purposes for which the Funds was established […] 
in promoting what is considered to be appropriate financial policies’. At the end, the term conditionality was 
not expressly included in the original Articles of Agreement. Darrow (2003) 46. 
31 Development Committee (2006) Strengthening Bank Group engagement on governance and anticorruption 
<siteresources.worldbank.org/DEVCOMMINT/Documentation/2104651/DC2006.0017(E)-Governance.pdf> 
[accessed on 27October 2006]. 
32 Art III, Sec4 (7) provides an exception to this provision: ‘Loans made or guaranteed by the Bank shall, except 
in special circumstances, be for the purpose of specific projects of reconstruction or development’. 
33 See Shams (2004) 2; Bruculeri (2004) 71 and Shihata (1995) 54. These programs included emphasized the 
fiscal discipline, redirection of public expenditure priorities towards health, education and infrastructure, tax 
reform, unified/competitive exchange rate, secure property rights, deregulation, trade liberalization, 
privatization, promoting foreign direct investment and finance liberalization. Nevertheless, Dreher (2002) 8 
suggested that ‘in spite of the project nature of most of the Bank’s lending operations prior to the 80s, lending 
was not unconditional. The Bank’s conditions were very similar to that of the Fund and covered public sector 
budget deficits, credit to the private sector, currency devaluation and reduction.’  
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by the 1989 World Bank Africa Sub-Sahara Report. This Report identified governance as the 
basic issue in the development strategy of the countries that were performing poorly.34  
Following the release of the Report, the Bank’s Board of Executive Directors decided to pay 
closer attention to governance.35 Since then, the concept of governance, which was 
considered as a taboo within the World Bank’s circles, became the new recipes of its lending 
operations.36   
As conditionality of the Bank’s loans, governance was applied for the first time in the case of 
Kenya in 1990,37 and became over the decade a customary feature of most International 
Financial Institutions lending operations.38 A Bank’s study over the period 2000-2005 
substantiates this trend: about 54% of conditions and 68% of benchmarks attached to loans 
were in public governance areas.39 The rise and spread of governance conditionality having 
been discussed, the next section will deal with its operationalization. 
2.3  THE WORLD BANK’S OPERATIONALIZATION OF 
GOVERNANCE CONDITIONALITY 
The Bank Governance reforms' policies focus on the following sectors:40  
• Public sector expenditure, financial management and procurement, 
• Administrative and civil service reform,  
• Tax policy and administration,  
• Decentralization,  
• Rule of Law, legal institutions and judicial reform, 
• Accountability and anti-corruption.  
                                                 
34 Schlemmer-Schulte (2001) 694. 
35 Ibid, 695. 
36 Shams Opcit 2. 
37 Raghavan (1997) from <www.sunsonline.org/trade/areas/finance/03240097.htm> [accessed on 23 October 
2006]. 
38 Kappur and Weeb (2000) Governance-related conditionalities of the International Financial Institutions, 
New York and Geneva: UNCTAD.  For the evolution of Governance Conditionality in the International 
Monetary Fund, see Nanda (2006) 276-279; Dreher (2002) 8. 
39 World Bank (2005) 1sqq. 
40 Ibidem, see also Shihata (1995)56 seq. 
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At this level, it should be observed that political accountability, which is another component 
of governance, is left aside by the World Bank who persistently argues that it falls outside its 
mandate.41  This approach is different from that adopted by the UNDP and the Institute on 
Governance42 which share the view that given the inextricable relationship between the 
principles of governance, ‘it is not enough to meet only some of the principles; all of 
principles need to be present, to at least some degree, to ensure good governance.’43  
Concerning the modalities of governance conditionality, they are not different from those of 
the traditional conditions applied by the World Bank.44  
Henceforth governance may be used as prior conditions: in this case conditions are viewed as 
policies and institutional actions that the borrower should accomplish before funding is made 
available.45
Governance’s principles are also used as triggers and benchmarks. In the first case, the 
reforms are considered as prior actions for future operations.46 In the second case, the 
reforms aim at describing the contents and results of the borrower’s program. 
The distinction between triggers and benchmarks on one hand and prior conditions on the 
other hand is important.47 Firstly, unlike prior conditions which are listed in the loan 
agreements, triggers and benchmarks are not mentioned. Secondly, failure to comply with 
prior conditions leads to non-release of funding, unless the Bank’s Executive Board approves 
                                                 
41 This approach, which is backed by the Bank’s official notably I. SHIHATA, is nevertheless criticized by 
Edgar, Marshall and Bassett (2006) 4.  
42 Ibid 5. These two Institutions have adopted five principles (legitimacy and voice, direction, performance, 
accountability and fairness) divided into sub-principles (participation and consensus orientation, strategic vision, 
responsiveness, effectiveness and efficiency, accountability and transparency, equity and rule of law). 
43 Ibid 6. 
44 The analysis of this section is taken from World Bank (2005) 4seq. 
45 For a single-tranche operation, the conditions are usually met before the operation is presented to the board of 
Executive Directors for approval meanwhile in the case of a multi-tranche operation the borrowing country is 
required to comply with tranche-release conditions before any further disbursement is made 
46 Ibidem. In this case, the reforms might also serve as indicators of progress in the implementation of the 
overall program of the borrower 
47 This is also important for although governance conditionalities represent almost half of the World Bank 
overall conditionalities, just one-quarter of all governance conditionality was imposed as prior actions Wood 
Opcit 16; See also WOOD (2005), <www.debtireland.org/resources/index.htm>[accessed on 23 October 2006]. 
In the case of Chad, it was clearly demonstrated that ring the period 1995-2005 benchmark included in the loans 
agreement concluded with the Bank represented more than 40% of the conditions. See World Bank (2005) 58. 
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a waiver of the conditions; meanwhile compliance with triggers and benchmarks are not 
determinative for the disbursement of loans.48   
The next issue to be addressed the legitimacy of the Bank’s governance agenda.  
2.4  LEGITIMACY OF THE WORLD BANK’S GOVERNANCE 
AGENDA 
The legitimacy of the World Bank’s governance conditionality has been questioned, both by 
scholars and NGOs.49 The issue is whether the World Bank can promote governance through 
conditionality without violating its own Articles of Agreement. Arguments for and against 
the World Bank’s governance agenda will be presented, followed by a discussion. 
2.4.1  ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE BANK’S GOVERNANCE 
AGENDA 
In the first place, opponents of the World Bank’s governance agenda argue that it is a 
violation of its mission creep as stipulated in its Articles of Agreement, whose Art IV, Sec.10 
clearly states: 
‘The Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member; nor shall 
they be influenced in their decisions by the political character of the member or members 
concerned. Only economic considerations shall be relevant to their decisions, and these 
considerations shall be weighed impartially in order to achieve the purposes stated.’ 50   
Henceforth, a literal reading of this provision suggests that the Bank should restraint itself 
from attaching governance reforms to its lending programs because of its strong political 
                                                 
48 Nevertheless as a World Bank survey suggested, borrowing countries continue to think that they have to 
comply with all the Benchmarks in a police matrix. World Bank (2005) 53. 
49 Some of these organizations include: ATTAC, A SEED, Bank Information Center, Bank Watch, Corporate 
Watch, Center for Rethinking the Bretton Woods Project, 50 Years in Enough Network, Third World Network, 
Focus on the Global South, Friends of the Earth and The Whirled Bank Group. Quoted by Wijngaarden (2006) 
75 from <dare.uva.nl/document/32464 http://dare.uva.nl/document/32464> [accessed on 15 March 2007]. 
50  This provision is coupled with that of art. III, s 5 (b) and art V, s 6 which state: ‘The Bank shall make 
arrangements to ensure that the proceeds of any loan are used only for the purposes for which the loan was 
granted, with due attention to considerations of economy and efficiency and without regard to political or other 
non-economic influences or considerations. The President, officers and staff of the Bank, in the charge of their 
offices, owe their duty entirely to the Bank and to no other authority. Each member of the Bank shall respect the 
international character of this duty and shall refrain from all attempts to influence any of them in the discharge 
of their duties.’ 
 12
component. This view is strengthened by the reluctance of the Bank during its early years of 
activities, to consider political issues.51   
Secondly, it is argued that the Bank through its governance agenda creates new principles 
governing issues already regulated, and implicitly erects them into binding principle of Public 
International Law into a binding rule. In fact, Governance issues such as human rights, 
environment, public procurement and others are in most cases already covered by 
international legal instruments. Moreover, these existing legal instruments are found mostly 
in Declarations, Principles or Programs of action to be implemented by every State in respect 
of its own context and realities.52   
It is believed that by erecting governance as a conditionality of its lending operations, the 
World Bank acts implicitly as a Supra Normative Institution and thus establishes a new 
hierarchy of International norms.53
Thirdly, it is argued that governance conditionality is an impediment to the borrower’s 
sovereignty over natural resources, since borrowers are compelled to implement policies that 
might not necessarily meet their priorities. 54 This is contrary to Art 1 of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Socio and Cultural Rights which provides:  
‘All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine 
their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.’55
                                                 
51 In effect, in the case of the Portuguese and South African loan in the 1960s, the President of the World Bank 
issued a statement on 29th March 1966 justifying the World Bank’s non-compliance with the UN General 
Assembly Resolutions calling upon all the specialized agencies of the UN to take necessary steps to deny 
technical and economic assistance to the governments of South Africa and Portugal because of their respective 
apartheid and colonial policies. See Yilmaz Akyüz (2006) 16, Darrow (2003) 150 and Qureshi (1999) 211.  
Supporters of this view conclude that the Bank should return to its initial mission and abandon the issue of 
Governance to other UN specialized agencies Shams (2004) 21 and Wadrzyk (1999) 562 seq.  
52 Eg. The United Nation Millennium Declaration and the NEPAD. From the point of view of the hierarchy of 
norms of International Law, such Declarations, and Programs of action are considered as soft law as oppose to 
hard law, see to this effect Patel quoted by Kellerman (2003) 84. 
53 Schlemmer-Schulte Opcit 714seq. 
54 Art 2 of the UN Charter, art 1 of the International Covenant on Economic, Socio and Cultural Rights, as well 
as the UN/GA Resolution 1803 of 1962. 
55 Waart (1992) 16.They are of the view that Promoting development is the rationale behind the existence of UN 
specialized Institutions which are therefore are bound by several decisions of the World Institution on the Right 
to Development and are under both legal and moral obligation to work for the achievement of that goal. See also 
Anghie (2005) 260. 
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2.4.2 ARGUMENTS FAVOURABLE TO THE WORLD BANK’S 
GOVERNANCE AGENDA. 
To begin with the proponents of the Bank’s governance agenda, led by Head and Shihata, 
argue that the concept of Development has evolved, leading the World Bank to adapt its 
activities to new variables and circumstances.56  
This position is substantiated by a teleological interpretation of the World Bank’s Articles of 
Agreement.57 In effect relying on Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, the former General Counsel of the Bank, I. Shihata, in a Memorandum which was 
later adopted by the Executive Board of Director, suggested a broad interpretation of the 
World Bank’s Articles of Agreement to enable the institution to serve the changing needs of 
its members.58
The second argument in support of the Bank’s governance agenda is based on the premises 
that the Bank is a provider of public international goods. As Ibrahim Shihata suggested ‘the 
Bank transforms many ideals of the UN Declarations and covenants regarding economic, 
social and cultural human rights through its lending operations, into realities.’59  This 
explains the presence of a human right component in many projects funded by the Bank, even 
though a lot of controversies exist on this new agenda.60  
Thirdly, it has been argued that the World Bank, as any other lending institution,  is 
concerned with the repayment of the fund disbursed and is thus forced to consider the 
financial and country risks of its borrowers.61 Such attitude cannot be considered as a 
hindrance the borrowers’ sovereignty, as Head suggested, borrowers have three options: to 
                                                 
56 Head (2004) 270 sqq and Shihata (1995) 54. 
57 The teleological interpretation was accepted as a mean of interpretation of international convention by the 
International Court of Justice in its Advising Opinion, 20 July 1962, certain expenses of the United Nations. 
<www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idecisions/isummaries/iceunsummary620720.htm> [accessed on 20 March 2007]. 
58 Legal Memorandum dated December 21, 1990 under the title Issues of ‘governance’ in borrowing members: 
the extent of their relevance under the Bank’s articles of agreement See Shihata, I.FI (1995) 11 and 557 sqq. 
This interpretation has served the legal basis for the World Bank’s involvement in many UN post conflict 
operations in country members such as the Democratic Republic of Congo and Iraq; see to this effect See Boon 
(2007) 513; Ciorciari (1998) 292 and Medenica (2004) 663. 
59 See Shihata (1995) 568 quoted by Schlemmer-Schulte, S Opcit, 693. 
60 Darrow (2003) 195 sqq. 
61 Delaume (1967) 313sqq. 
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reject the World Bank’s offer and look for other sources of funding, to decide to do without 
the project, or to accept the Bank’s proposal.62  
Finally proponents of the Bank Governance Agenda conclude that globalization places the 
State in a position different from the one it was granted after the Westphalia Treaty, since 
there are more and more instances where State are forced by circumstances to share their 
sovereignty in order to survive or to be restored.63 This is the case of countries that, because 
of their political situation, are placed at one moment of their history under the UN 
Administration in order to preserve their integrity, such as Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia, Kosovo and 
East Timor.64
2.4.3 ASSESSING THE ARGUMENTS ON THE LEGITIMACY OF THE 
WORLD BANK’S GOVERNANCE AGENDA 
In the first place, it should be acknowledged that the World Bank’s Articles of Agreement on 
the prohibition against political considerations cannot be entirely insulated from the political 
realities affecting the lending operations, and that the circumstances that led to the creation of 
the Bretton Woods institutions have changed considerably.  
Also, one should admit that in the era of globalization, sovereignty has become vulnerable 
and less absolute as in the glorious days of the Westphalia Treaty.65  
However, it is difficult to empower the World Bank with governance and other activities 
related to development, based on the argument of the teleological interpretation of its Articles 
of Agreement. This is because the same interpretation will be valid for other UN Specialized 
Agencies like the United Nations Development Program, which also have a long experience 
and are well equipped to deal with development in Third World countries.  
In addition, even if one agrees on the teleological interpretation, it should however be 
considered that an extremely flexible approach might open the Pandora box to all types of 
interpretations. Finally, although borrowing countries freely chose to enter into loan 
                                                 
62 Head 2004: 280. Nevertheless, as the following section will show, that choice cannot be considered to be 
totally free 
63 For more details on the concept of share sovereignty see Krasner (2004) 85-120. 
64 Ibidem. 
65 See Jackson (1999) 4; Valaskakis (2001) 51 sqq.  
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agreement with the World Bank, attention should however be paid to the bargaining power 
between the two parties, as well as the context of the negotiation process, for all this 
ultimately influences the outcomes of the negotiations and the content of the loan. 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
In sum, conditionality has gradually become a common feature of the World Bank’s lending 
programs. It now covers a wide range of areas including governance, environment and human 
rights.  
Despite this evolution, it should be noted that there has not been a subsequent amendment of 
the World Bank’s Articles of Agreements, so as to bring light and clarifications over these 
concepts which are more than controversial. As a result, not only the legitimacy of the new 
agendas is still questioned; but also the tension between the World Bank and its State 
members on one hand, as well as between the World Bank and NGOs on the other hand has 
increased and has become persistent. This is mainly due to the little role play by borrowing 
countries in the setting-up of the World Bank’s governance principles as well as the 
flexibility left to them in the implementation phase of the loan.   
The next point this paper shall now address is that of the World Bank’s governance 
conditionality in the Chad pipeline investment project.  
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CHAPTER 3 THE WORLD BANK’S GOVERNANCE 
CONDITIONALITY IN THE CHAD –PIPELINE PROJECT 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides an overview of the context prevailing in Chad at the time the project 
was intended. This in return helps to understand the World Bank’s involvement, as well as 
the content of governance conditionality.66 The analysis ends with the legal implications of 
governance conditionality on the autonomy of the borrower. 
3.2 CONTEXT OF THE CHAD PIPELINE PROJECT: AN UNSTABLE 
AND LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRY 
Three points are examined under this heading: the unstable nature of the political climate of 
the country, its economy and the perspective of petroleum production. 
Firstly the unstable political climate of the country. A few years after Chad achieved its 
independence on August 11 1960, instability became quasi-present all over the country, as 
result of military coups.67 Apart from President Tombalbaye who led the country to it 
international sovereignty, all the other presidents have acceded to the power by overthrowing 
the ruling leader, thus leaving the country in permanent instability.68 In addition, the country 
has faced a cumulative of more than 29 years of Civil War, many of which involved 
                                                 
66 The Republic of Chad is a landlocked country in north-central Africa of 1.284 000 km², with a population of 
about 7 million inhabitants. The country shares boarders with Niger, Libya, the Sudan, the Central African 
Republic, Cameroon, and Nigeria. Lake Chad, from which the country gets its name, lies on the western border 
with Niger and Nigeria. 
67 The Institutions in Chad did not become weak in Chad only after the country achieved its independence. 
During the colonial era already, the basic functions of governance were often neglected throughout the colonial 
period. Even in the Southern part of South, there were problems for officials in the French colonial service 
resisted assignments, so posts often went to novices or to out-of- favor officials. Still, major scandals occurred 
periodically, and many of the posts remained vacant. In 1928, As consequence, the people in the northern part of 
the country (Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti) were left alone after a tacit agreement between the French military 
administrators and the inhabitants of the desert, as long as caravan trails remained relatively secure and minimal 
levels of law and order were met <cweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+td0017)> [accessed 
on 27 October 2006]. 
68 President Tombalbaye was overthrown in 1975 by General Felix Maloum who was also overthrown in 1980 
by his Defense Minister Hissen Habre. In 1990, Idriss Déby, a former Defense Minister and head of the Patriotic 
Salvation Movement took control of the capital and overthrown President Habre.  
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neighboring countries.69  Consequently, Chad is considered as soft State, with a little capacity 
to undertake and implement long term reforms.70  
Secondly, with regard to economy, Chad is ranked 171 out of 177 in the 2006 UNDP Human 
Development Report.71 Human Development Indicators are very low in the country: e.g. Life 
expectancy at birth is 49 years, compared to the African regional average of 51; vaccination 
coverage rates for measles was 28 percent in 1996; vet primary enrollment rates (NPER) is 
still very low; the literacy rate is among the lowest in the world and access to safe water is 
limited to about one fourth of the population.72   
Henceforth, the perspective of becoming an oil producer was considered by all Chadian as a 
great opportunity. It was projected that the development and export of oil could significantly 
affect economic growth. It was also expected that additional resources would be used to raise 
living standards through investments in the social sectors, enhance private sector activity in 
the country and lead to the creation of employment.73  
3.3 WORLD BANK’S INVOLMENT IN THE CHAD PROJECT. 
Four main reasons explain the Bank’s involvement in the project. 74
Firstly, the World Bank through its involvement, provided investors with a guarantee they 
could not get from Chad, considered both as a political and economic risk. The World Bank 
thus acted as insurance that will mitigate the risk incurred by those investors.75
                                                 
69 These include Libya, Central African Republic and Sudan. See Wright (1989) 132.  
70 Szirmai (2005) 259. The implication from an investment point of view is that the country is regarded as a high 
risk country According to the OECD classification released on January 26th 2007; Chad obtains 7 points, which 
is the highest score. From <www.oecd.org/dataoecd/47/29/3782900.pdf> [accessed on 27 October 2006 
71 UNDP (2006) 286, from <hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/pdfs/report/HDR_2006_Tables.pdf>, [accessed on 27 
October 2006]. 
72 This situation is worsened both by the climate conditions because the desert coverts much of Chad’s territory, 
and corruption. The Country is ranked 156 out of 163 in the Transparency International (2006) Corruption 
Perception Index. From <www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2006> [accessed on 27 
December 2006]. 
73Data use for the analysis of this section are derived from 
<web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/EXTREGINI/EXTCHADCAMPIPE
LINE/0,,contentMDK:20554432~menuPK:1328817~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:843238,00
.html> [accessed on 27 October 2006]; see also <www.ccsrp-tchad.org/site/pics/PETROLE.pdf.> [accessed on 
27 October 2006]. 
74See Calderesi (2006) The trouble with Africa. Why Aid isn’t working? London: New Haven. The entire chapter 
12 of the Book deals with the Chad Pipeline Project.  
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Secondly, the Chadian Government needed funds to afford its contribution to the consortium; 
henceforth, through the loan agreement, the Bank provided it with a sum of US$ 39.5 
million.76
Thirdly, for oil companies involved in the project, the presence of the Bank was important to 
lower the criticisms of NGOs and civil society international organizations, which have been 
protesting against the project because of its important environmental consequences,77 and 
most of all because of the Chadian Government’s Human Rights performance.78  
Fourthly the World Bank regarded the project as an opportunity to implement reforms and 
policies that were part of the Chad Poverty Reduction Strategy Program. It was hoped that 
through the project, Chad might achieve what has been impossible over the past years: to 
reduce poverty and engage itself on the path of development.79
 
3.4 GOVERNANCE CONDITIONALITY IN CHAD IBRD- LOAN 
AGREEMENT. 
International loans are driven by two main principles: the principle of autonomy of the parties 
which are free to insert in their contract whatever clause they like provided they do not act 
against the law; and the principle of the applicable law.80  Under this heading, are presented 
the content and the analysis of governance conditionality in the Chad-IBRD loan agreement.  
                                                                                                                                                        
75 This was really important because while the project was under preparation, some companies abandoned the 
consortium: Chevron early in 1992, followed by Conoco in 1993, Shell and Elf in 1999. 
76 See Article II of the Chad-IBRD loan agreement.  
77 Darrow (2003) 217. 
78 Amnesty International (2005) 16 seq; see also Darrow (2003) 217. 
79 For more detail on see <www.ccsrp-tchad.org/site/pics/PETROLE.pdf.> [accessed on 27 October 2006]. 
80Bradlow 
<www.unitar.org/dfm/resource_center/document_series/Document9/Bradlow/4Lesson2.htm>[accessed on 20 
February 2007] According to this principle, the parties to a loan agreement are recommended to insert in their 
agreement a clause specifying the law to be applied; domestic law or international law. 
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3.4.1 CONTENT OF GOVERNANCE CONDITIONALITY  
In the World Bank lending operations, the loan agreement describes both the project 
objectives and the obligations of the parties.81  
In the case of the Chad-IBRD investment loan agreement, the Bank’s obligation was to 
provide Chad with a substantial sum of US$39.5 millions.82
In return, Chad undertook several obligations: to use the funds to ‘finance part B and C of the 
Pipeline Project’, to pay the fee, the charge and interest of the debt and the principal 
amount.83  
In addition, specific obligations related to the Project were included in the Loan Agreement. 
This paper is primarily concerned with the obligations included in the Petroleum Revenue 
Management Program (PRMP), because it is related to the Bank’s governance 
conditionality.84  
The PRMP refers to the Petroleum Revenue Management Program of the Borrower, as 
described in Schedule 5 of the loan agreement.85 Schedule 5 of the loan agreement imposes 
two set of obligations on Chad. 
The first series of obligations is related to the modalities of allocation, distribution and 
investment of the petroleum revenues provided by Parag 4 of Schedule 5.86  This includes the 
passing of a law and related texts so as to give effect to the modalities of allocation of the oil 
revenues provided in the PRMP,87 the creation of new institutions, and the respect of all the 
procedure related to the use of funds. 
                                                 
81 World Bank, (2005) 11 
82 See art. II, sec.2 (1) of the Chad-IBRD loan agreement.  
83 Art. 2 of the loan agreement. These are obligations of any borrower in any particular loan agreement. 
84 Other obligations that fall within this category include the environmental and social assessment commitments. 
85 Art1, Parag rr, of the loan agreement. The Program objective is to assist Chad in reducing poverty. 
86 According to the provision of this paragraph, 80 percent of Royalties and 85% of the Dividends shall be 
allocated to expenditures, acceptable to the Bank, 5 percent of Royalties to decentralized authorities in the 
petroleum producing region as a supplement to the allocation […] to finance expenditures, acceptable to the 
Bank and 15 percent of royalties and dividends can be used to finance general recurrent expenditures for the non 
“Sovereign” sectors. For the funds deposited in the future generations’ fund it is stated that they shall be 
invested, under prudential rules and investment arrangements satisfactory to the Bank.  
87 This law is also known as the 1999 law. 
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At this level, it should be noticed that Parag 8 of Schedule 5 goes beyond the material 
obligation and adds a temporal obligation on Chad. Henceforth, it was expected from the 
Government to issue by no later than December 31, 2001, all the necessary implementation 
decrees.  
The last and probably the most ambiguous obligation comes from Parag 2 of Schedule 5 
which prevents Chad from any legislation change concerning the 1999 law in the following 
terms:  
‘Law No. 0001/PR/99 dated January 11, 1999, governing the management of the petroleum 
revenues (the Petroleum Revenue Management Law) shall not be amended or waived so as to 
materially and adversely affect the implementation of the Program’.88  
The second set of obligations is related to the accountability towards the Bank. Chad is 
required to publish the reports, audits, accounts and financial statements, following 
appropriate auditing principles acceptable to the Bank. Moreover, it is expected from the 
Government to make all the documents available to the Bank at its request.  
 
 
Table 1: Governance Conditionalities included in the Chad-IBRD Loan Agreement. 
Types of conditionalities: Actions expected from Chad 
Adoption of the 1999 Law 
Obligation not to amend the 1999 Law 
Adoption of all the implementation’s decrees 
Respect of share of funds allocated to 
different sectors 
 
 
 
Modalities of oil revenues’ allocation and use 
Respects of rules governing the withdraw of 
funds 
                                                 
88 See Parag 2 of Schedule 5 of the Chad-IBRD loan agreement.  
 21
 Creation of domestic institutions of 
monitoring 
Publication of reports, audits, accounts and 
financial statements, following appropriate 
auditing principles acceptable to the World 
Bank 
 
Accountability towards the Bank  
Information of the Bank.  
Sources: Schedule 5 of the Chad-IBRD investment loan agreement reported in the annex of this paper. 
 
3.4 .2 ANALYSIS OF THE CONTENT OF GOVERNANCE 
CONDITIONALITY IN THE CHAD-IBRD AGREEMENT 
The content of governance conditionality as it appears in the Chad-IBRD loan agreement 
reveals an asymmetrical relationship between the Bank and Chad, which in return affects its 
sovereignty and the effectiveness of the project.  This asymmetrical relationship is fully 
justified by the current imbalance within the Bank’s governance structure. 
A AN ASYMMETRICAL RELATIONASHIP BETWEEN THE BANK 
AND CHAD 
As it is appeared from the preceding paragraph, it is required from Chad to meet not only the 
obligations which are vested on any borrower,89 but also to implement in a satisfactory 
manner to the Bank, all the obligations described in the Petroleum Revenue Management 
Program. The numbers and the types of obligations imposed on such a country with a weak 
institutional capacity is questionable.90
                                                 
89 To pay back the capital and the interest of the loan received on the agreed date. 
90 As the context of the Project has revealed in the first section of this chapter, Chad an unstable country with 
weak institutions.  
 22
This asymmetrical relation between the parties is aggravated by the lack of clarity and 
vagueness of some expressions which are ‘ill defined’.91 In effect, the question is what should 
be considered ‘satisfactory and acceptable to the Bank’?92   
Schedule 5 provides neither a clear definition, nor objective criteria to be used. This lack of 
clarity leaves the door opened to a unilateral and discretionary interpretation by the Bank of 
what is satisfactory and what is not.  
It is believed that such situation undermines the contractual nature of a loan agreement and 
affects the autonomy of the borrower during the implementation phase of the project.93 The 
next step is to look at the Bank’s governance structure, which provides an explanation to this 
asymmetrical relationship. 
B IMPACT OF THE IMBALANCE OF THE BANK’S 
GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE IN THE DEFINITION ON 
CONDITIONALITIES APPLICABLE TO A LOAN. 
The analysis will start by a brief overview of the World Bank’s governance structure and its 
impact on both the definition of the World Bank’s governance principles, as well as it content 
during the negotiation of a loan agreement. 
Though all the power of the IBRD are vested in the Board of Governors,94 most have been 
delegated in practice to the Board of Executive Directors,95 responsible for the general 
conduct of the operations and the day-to-day running of the Bank.96 This includes the 
adoption of decisions on loans, credits, grants as well as the policies followed by the Bank in 
its operations.  
                                                 
91 Kaufman quoted by Court, Hyden and Mease (2002) 3 from <www.odi.org.uk/wga_governance/Docs/WGS-
discussionPaper2.pdf> [accessed on 14 March 2007]. 
92 This expression appears ten times throughout the PRMP. See also terms such as ‘materially and adversely 
affect the implementation of the Program. 
93 Kapur and Webb (2000) 16, CIDSE (2006) 13. Surprisingly the Bank applies different standards when 
dealing with the dominant shareholders, see to this effect Darrow (2003) 207 
94 Art V, sec 2 (a) of the IBRD Articles of Agreement. 
95 This delegation of power is permitted under Art V, Sec 2 (b) of the IBRD Articles of Agreement. 
96 Art V, Sec 4 of the IBRD Articles of Agreement. 
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Unlike the Board of Governor which is a plenary organ and where each member state is 
represented by one Governor, there are only 24 Executive Directors: five appointed by the 
members having the largest number of shares, and 19 representing the other members.97  Of 
the 19 remaining Executive Directors, only 2 represent all the Sub-Sahara African countries, 
and very little weight is attached to their vote (5.36% of the total of votes).98
This inequitable representation and the weighting voting system, which confers unequal 
decision-making influence to different member countries, lead ineluctably to the domination 
of wealthier nations during the voting of decisions and ultimately affect the sovereignty of 
borrowing countries99  
In fact since the weight voting system applied within the Board of Executive Directors, the 
setting-up of the World Bank’s governance principles by the Board is influenced by the 
economic philosophy of the most important members.100 In effect, the application of the 
majoritarianism rule101 is profitable to the major shareholders.102 As a result, the Bank’s 
policies are mainly driven by the neo-liberal philosophy of the important members and in 
most cases do not reflect the expectations and peculiarities of borrowing countries.103  
                                                 
97 The five Countries are: The United, Japan, Germany, France and the United Kingdom. Russia, Saudi Arabia 
and China are admitted to appoint each an Executive Director.  
98 Excluding South Africa and Ghana. See 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZATION/BODEXT/EXTEDS13/0,
,contentMDK:20183200~menuPK:396824~pagePK:64099144~piPK:64099061~theSitePK:396813,00.html. 
The same imbalance prevails in other World Bank Group’s Institutions: 3.35% within the IFC, 8.70% within 
the IDA and 8.90% within the MIGA. 
99 Indeed the alleged assumption behind the use of the weighted system in most International Financial 
Institutions is the need to reflect the economical power of the highly contracting parties. However, as Athena 
(2001) 203 rightly pointed out, this does not constitute a sufficient justification for the breach of the sovereign 
equality among nation states. 
100 France 4.30%, Germany 4.49, Japan 7.86, UK 4.30, USA 16.38. 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZATION/BODEXT/0,,contentMD
K:20124831~menuPK:64020035~pagePK:64020054~piPK:64020408~theSitePK:278036,00.html
101 Art V, Sec 4 (f) of the of the IBRD Articles of Agreement provides that ‘a quorum for any meeting of the 
Executive Directors shall be a majority of the Directors, exercising not less than one-half of the total voting 
power.’ the same majority is required for the adoption of any decisions within the Executive Board of the Bank.  
This situation, already detrimental to borrowing countries, is aggravated by the option left by Art.V, Sec.5 (a) 
which states: ‘The President shall be Chairman of the Executive Directors, but shall have no vote except a 
deciding vote in case of an equal division.’ Since in practice the President of the Bank has always been 
appointed by the USA, there is little doubt that in case of equal division, he will vote against the USA position. 
102  Athena Opcit, 213; Anghie (2000) 268. 
103 Surprisingly, the reforms promoted by the World Bank in borrowing countries through conditionality are 
rarely followed by the major members themselves, as it can be seen in the case of liberalization in the 
agricultural sector. It has been found that while developed countries show a strong support for such policies 
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As Tsai correctly suggested, ‘the disparities between the bargaining power held by the creditors 
and the debtor nations rendered the "negotiations" meaningless. As a result, any condition 
agreed to during "negotiations" [are] simply the product of economic coercion and cannot be 
characterized as voluntary’.104
Finally, the under- representation of borrower countries ultimately raises concern over the 
legitimacy of the Bank’s reform policies attached to its lending operations, and needs to be 
addressed. In fact, it has been acknowledged by the Bank’s Development Committee that 
“the long-term viability of the institution depends on its perceived legitimacy.”105  
3.5  CONCLUSION 
There is no doubt at all that the World Bank’s involvement in the construction of the Chad 
pipeline was an absolute necessity. The Chadian government was ready to make any type of 
concession, provided it completes its project. Despite the asymmetry of obligations between 
the two parties and reflected in the loan agreement, Chad had no alternative than to take the 
Bank’s offer. Described as unfair and illegal by Head,106 this situation overburdens the 
borrower who is bound to undertake a considerable number of reforms.  
This has led Krasner to conclude that the Chad-IBRD loan Agreement is a typical example 
where a country shares its sovereignty over the management of its natural resources.107 As 
the following chapter will show, such a situation is most like to affect the relationship 
between the Bank and the borrower during the implementation phase of the loan and 
ultimately, the effectiveness of the loan. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
within the World Bank’s Board of Executive Directors, they themselves have been providing continuously their 
agricultural sector with diverse forms of subsidies. This situation is highlighted by the number of claims brought 
against them before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. See Head (2004) 294. 
104 Tsai (2000) 1327. See also Darrow (2003) 58 seq. 
105 Development Committee (2007) 1. This position substantiates the point already made by Athena (2001) 42, 
that legitimacy is of great importance in the international arena, because States are most likely to comply with 
international arrangements they perceive as legitimate. 
106 Head (2004) 262. See also Wijngaarden Opcit 63, Anghie (2000) 262 
107 Krasner (2004)1094. 
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CHAPTER4 RELATIVE EFFECTIVENESS OF GOVERNANCE 
CONDITIONALITY IN THE CHAD PIPELINE PROJECT 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
Raustiala defines effectiveness as the measure of an observable change induced by a 
particular rule.108 Thus, a rule is effective if it leads to certain measurable behaviors or 
outcomes. The issue at this level is whether the Bank’s governance conditionality included in 
the Chad-IBRD loan agreement has led to the economic and social changes that were 
expected at the time the project was drafted.109  This chapter deals with both the outcomes 
and shortcomings of the project. 110
For this research, the following indicators will be used to capture the economic performance 
of Chad in terms of its macro-economic and the micro-economic performance, because of 
their availability: 111   
• The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and GDP index.112  
• The GDP per capita113 and the GDP index;  
• The Government spending in the area of health and education, considered as poverty 
priority sectors by the Petroleum Revenue Management Program. 
 
                                                 
108 Raustiala (2000) 393. 
109 The implementation of governance conditionality should not however be considered as the unique 
explanatory variable of such an economic performance. Other variables such as the political climate, the flow of 
Official Development Assistance received and which do not fall in the scope of this research might have 
contributed significantly. 
110 Two moments will be considered: 2003 before which is year Chad started producing oil and 2006 because of 
the availability of data.  
111 The macro-economic performance gives a picture of economic growth in the country during a given period 
meanwhile the micro-economic performance provides an overview of the social situation of consumers. 
112 It presents the final value of all the goods and services produced in a specific country. 
113 These two indicators offer a measure of the economic power of consumer within a country. 
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4.2 OUTCOMES OF THE PROJECT 
Two aspects are considered here: the economic and institutional outcomes. 
Firstly, with regard to the macro-economic outcomes, statistics reveal that there has been a 
significant increase of both the GDP and the GDP per capita as highlighted in Table 2. The 
GDP has increased from CFA 1582.1 (just one year after the Country has started earning 
from its oil production) to CFA 3496.0 Billion in 2006. 
Consecutively to this boost the GDP per capita has also doubled (from Francs CFA 132.512 
to Francs CFA 293.232) during the same period.  The statistics also show the importance of 
the share of oil revenue in GDP (it represents almost 50%) and in the general budget of the 
Government.114  
Table 2: Overview of the evolution of selected Human Development Indicators in Chad 
between 2003 and 2006. 
Year GDP (Francs 
CFA 
Billions) 
GDP excluding 
petroleum 
revenue 
(Francs CFA) 
Dvpt  
Index 
Health 
expenditure, 
% of GDP 
Education 
expenditu
re, % of 
GDP 
Education 
 index 
GDP per 
capita 
(Francs 
CFA) 
Inflatio
n rate 
% 
HDR 
Rank 
2006  3496.0 1827.9 0.368 2.6 1.6 0.29 293232 8.0 171/177 
2005  3104.6 1652.7 0.341 2.7  NA 0.30 199424 7.9 173/177 
2004  1736.4 1416.2 0.371 2.0 2.0 0.42 157440 -5.3 167/177 
2003 1582.1 1355.3 0.376 2.5  2.0  0.41 132512 -1.8 165/175 
Sources: Data derived from UNDP and CAEMC115  
Secondly, the implementation of the World Bank governance conditionality has resulted in 
the creation of a number of institutions including the Oil Control and Monitoring Group and 
the 5% Temporary Management Committee.  These institutions were aimed at improving 
accountability and transparency in the management of public revenue, and enhancing the 
participation of the civil society in the management of resources of the country.  In effect, 
                                                 
114 Gary and Reisch Opcit 71. 
115 See to this effect: UNDP (2006) 286- 334, UNDP (2005) 218-304, UNDP (2004) 139- 205 and UNDP, 
(2003) 308-340; available at < http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/ > [accessed on 27 October 2006]; and 
http://www.izf.net/izf/Documentation/Rapports/Rapport%20Surveillance%20Multilaterale%202006%20de%20l
a%20CEMAC.pdf 
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their approbation is necessary for the government’s expenditure to be funded by the oil 
revenue. In addition, they monitor all the projects funded out of the oil revenue.116
Despite these outcomes, the next section will show that the implementation of the World 
Bank governance conditionality has been proven to be relative in the case of the Chad-
Pipeline Project.     
4.3 LIMIT OF THE BANK’S GOVERNANCE APPROACH IN THE 
CHAD PROJECT 
Three points are developed under this heading: the social and institutional shortcomes, the 
rigidity of the model itself and the lack of a proper dispute settlement mechanism. 
4.3.1 SOCIAL AND INSTITUTIONAL SHORTCOMINGS OF THE 
PROEJECT 
Firstly, the World Bank newly founded approach has not brought a deep change in the 
Chadian society and the expected results are still awaited in many sectors. As Table 2 above 
clearly shows, not all the Human Development Indicators in Chad have been ameliorated. 
The education sector is the most conspicuous example, where there has been a decrease with 
regard to both the education index and the percentage of GDP allocated to it. Also, as the 
results of the study carried out by Gary and Reisch indicate that Chad itself has not benefited 
from its natural resources, as no refined products derived from Chad’s oil are available in the 
country.117
Secondly, the increase noticed in the GDP per capita should not be considered in absolute 
terms; it should be taken simultaneously with the inflation rate in the country, which has 
increased from -1.8 in 2003 to 8.0 in 2006. This state of affairs does not constitute a surprise, 
because already in its early 2002 Management and recommendation Report, the Inspection 
                                                 
116 Art 13 and 14 of the 1999 Law. 
117 Gary and Reisch Opcit 92. See also Merhi (2002) [available at 
http://www.columbia.edu/itc/sipa/martin/chad-cam/Anthony.htm] accessed on May 8th 2007]. It has been found 
that Chad’s need for electricity generation and distribution, even in the capital, remains severe and is a key 
impediment to increased economic development 
 28
Panel of the Bank, raised many concerns with regard to the Poverty reduction aspect of the 
project.118  
Thirdly the newly created Institutions have been proven to be less effective than expected.119 
Thus, the 5% Temporary Management Committee is plagued by both an identity crisis and an 
operational problem (delay in the designation of members, delay in providing the Committees 
with necessary means of functioning), and lacks a real power and full autonomy from the 
central authorities.120 Also, there have been instances where projects funded have not been 
fully monitored by the Oil Control and Monitoring Group as well as the 5% Temporary 
Management Committee121.  The lack of real power of sanction by these various Committees 
has also been pointed out as one of their weaknesses.  
4.3.2 THE RIGIDITY OF THE BANK’S MODEL AND TENSION WITH 
THE ECONOMIC SOVEREIGNTY OF CHAD.  
It is appeared from the preceding Chapter that due to the imbalance within the Bank’s 
Executive Board, the autonomy of the borrower was already undermined during the setting 
up of the governance standards and the determination of the content of governance 
conditionality to be included into the loan agreement. This paragraph examines the tension 
between the Bank and Chad during the implementation phase of the project. 
                                                 
118Report available at 
<siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/Resources/ManagementReport82102.pdf>. [Accessed 
on 27 October 2006]. 
119 There has been instances were the Government couldn't comply with some of procedures and modalities 
required to use the available monies. 
120  As Gary and Reisch (2005) 64 correctly argued, ‘While [different committee] can influence the budgeting 
process, reject ill-founded expenditures and investigate the execution of projects […] the ability to ensure that 
oil revenues are used for poverty reduction depends on the willingness of the judiciary to prosecute cases of 
misuse, fraud or corruption. 
121 In it’s 2004 General Report, the Oil Control and Monitoring Group indicated that out of the CFA F 82 810 
741 000 billion, only CFA F 36 828 685 000 billion have been allocated to Priority poverty reduction sectors ; 
which is far less than the 80% provided by Art. 8 of the 1999 Law; the same situation occurred during the first 
term of the 2005 fiscal year where out of CFA F 144 386 736 000 billion, CFA F 97 110 567 000 was allocated 
to the Priority poverty reduction sectors. CCRSP, (2005), Rapport d’activité du premier trimestre 2005 sur la 
situation générale des Revenus Pétroliers alloués aux Secteurs Prioritaires au titre du budget de l’Etat pour 
l’exercice 2005 avalable at <www.ccsrp-tchad.org/site/page.cfm?owner=C377F0F4-B3BD-6A66-
8D10BE09FDF56CEB&template=department_default.cfm> [accessed on 23 October 2006]. The 2004 Report is 
available at Compte Spécial Revenus Pétroliers (5617/1) <www.ccsrp-
tchad.org/site/page.cfm?owner=C35E4D48-93BB-7ADF-
6D3853466B6CF484&template=department_default.cfm> [accessed on 23 October 2006]. 
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First, the Bank’s model of Governance Conditionality has been proven to be static rather than 
dynamic. Schedule 5 of the loan agreement prevents the Government from any amendment 
that may ‘materially and adversely affect the implementation of the Program.’ In practice, 
this has led to a disproportionate allocation of GDP to the identified sectors. The public work 
sector for example received in 2004, almost six times what was allocated to the education 
sector.122  
Secondly the Bank’s model undermines the domestic participation in the definition of the 
country’s priorities. The National Assembly for example has seen its legislative powers being 
cut, since what the main preoccupation of the government is to come up with a program that 
comply with Bank’s prescriptions, rather than to have one which is satisfactory to the 
parliamentarians and inconsistent with the Bank’s policies.123  
This rigidity leaves some of the main problems unsolved.  It has been found for example that 
the failure to include expenditures on the judiciary and energy needs into priority sector was 
illogical, given the importance of the two sectors on both the improvement of public 
administration, and economic development. 
Ultimately at the end of the year 2005, the Chadian Government, pressed by a series of coup 
d’Etat and a new rebellion in the Northern part of the country, ignored the Bank’s prohibition 
and brought a substantial amendment to the original 1999 revenue management law. It 
broadened the definition of priority sectors so as to include, among others priority sectors 
territorial administration and security.124
                                                 
122Ibid, 70seqq. This Ministry received over 19 billion CFAF ($37.25 million) in the 2004 budget, which is more 
than half of the total petroleum revenues available for priority sectors. 
123 It is suggested from study carried out by Gary and Reisch (2005) 70 Seq, that the budget is not discussed in 
practice by the parliamentarians, because any amendment that will materially modify the allocation provided by 
Schedule 5 is prohibited. This rigidity leaves some of the main problems unsolved.  It has been found for 
example that the failure to include expenditures on the judiciary and energy needs into priority sector was 
illogical, given the importance of the two sectors on both the improvement of public administration, and 
economic development. 
124 Furthermore, the amended law allowed changes in the definition of priority sectors to be made by decree. 
Finally, the new legislation eliminated the Future Generations Fund, increased from 13.5 % to 30% the 
percentage of royalties and dividends to be allocated to non-priority sectors 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/EXTREGINI/EXTCHADCAMP
IPELINE/0,,contentMDK:20531903~menuPK:1104029~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:84323
8,00.html  [acceded on the 27 September 2006]. 
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4.3.3 LACK OF A NEUTRAL ASSESSMENT AND DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT MECHANISMS 
Following the 1992 Wapenhaus Report on the quality of the World Bank’s loan portfolio, the 
Bank instituted a Panel Inspection.125 Composed of three members, the Panel’s main task is 
to carry out an administrative review of the World Bank funded project. The panel receives 
complains from any affected party in the territory of the Borrower or one of the Bank’s 
Executive Director.126
Indeed it should be acknowledged this move related to the assessment of the projects funded 
by the World Bank, so as to increase their effectiveness.127 In the case of the Chad Project for 
example, in addition to the Inspection Panel, an International Advisory Group was also 
created.  128
Despite this evolution in the Bank’s practice, Inspection Panel has raises many concerns:  
First it is not perceived as an independent body, since it part of the administrative structure of 
the Bank and the members are nominated by the President of Bank before their appointment 
by the Board of Executive Directors. 129 Secondly, the mandate of the Panel is restricted to 
the administrative review of the projects; that is whether or not the Bank has complied with 
its procedural rules.130 Thirdly the Panel inspection is viewed as an investigatory body with 
                                                 
125 The Panel was created by Resolution 93-10/IBRD and 93-6/IDA of September 22nd 1993 of the IBRD’s 
Board of Executive Directors.  The text of the Resolution is available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/Resources/ResolutionMarch2005.pdf [accessed 
on the March 27th 2007]. 
126 Two requirements should be fulfilled for a party to be considered as affected: the party should establish that 
it has an interest or is likely to be directly affected by a project funded by the Bank, and the damage should be 
the result of the alleged violation by the Bank of its own rules. See Shihata, I (1994) 54. 
127 Shihata, Ibid 1seq. 
128 See http://www.gic-iag.org; see also Krasner (2004) 1094. 
129 Nancy (2004) from <www.servicesforall.org/html/worldbank/judgeandjury.shtml> [accessed on 27 
September 2006], Killick (2005) 
<web.worldbank.org/BSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/0.,contentMDK:20292755~pagePK:41367~piPK:51533
~theSitePK:40941,00.html> [accessed on 27 October 2006]. 
130 Para 12 of the Resolution creating the Inspection Panel. 
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no power of decision. It can only address its findings and recommendations to the Board of 
Executive Directors who is not in any case bound.131
In the particular case of the Chad Pipeline, the Inspection Panel and the International 
Advisory Group are outside-based Institutions,132 which only visit the country during 
statutory missions.133  
Concerning the settlement of dispute between the World Bank and borrowing countries, the 
governance agenda set up by the World Bank lack’s a neutral mechanism similar to the one 
provided by the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Dispute (ICSID).134  
Instead, loan agreements between the Bank and borrowing countries contain a standard 
provision providing the World Bank with a set of unilateral remedies in case the loan 
agreement was not implemented in a manner satisfactory to the Bank.135
Such a situation, gives a large margin of discretion to the Bank, and opens the door to 
controversies over the interpretation of what amount to non-compliance. In the case of the 
Chad pipeline project, the government amended the 1999 Law to adapt it to its new 
preoccupations.136 The World Bank did not share the same view and suspended all 
disbursement of funds to Chad, because it considered Chad has breached Schedule 5 of the 
                                                 
131 Parag 23 of the Resolution creating the Inspection Panel. Thus it is not within the Panel’s power to make 
recommendation on the adequacy or suitability of the Bank’s existing policies or procedures.  See Shihata, Ibid, 
52seq; Carmody 2000: 1327-1334 and Roos (2001) 482. 
132 The International Advisory Group is based in Canada see http://www.gic-
iag.org/doc/IAG_Communique_January_2007.pdf; meanwhile the Inspection Panel of the Bank is based in 
Washington. 
133 These statutory missions most of the time hold once in a year and will last only few days. For example 
despite the fact that 2006 was marked by a deterioration then amelioration of the relation between Chad and the 
Bank, the IAG couldn’t go beyond one statutory visit. See <www.gic-
iag.org/doc/IAG_Communique_January_2007.pdf> [accessed on 23 October 2006]. Considering this situation, 
NGOs from the South argue that such monitoring should not be given greater considerations, CIDSE (2006) 11. 
134 This is an independent forum provided by the Bank, to settle all disputes arising between foreign investors 
and a host State. 
135 These remedies include: suspension of further installments and tranches of the loan and cancellation of the 
loan. See Art V of the Chad-IBRD loan agreement. 
136 As developed in the previous Section, the government broadened the scope of the law so as to include among 
priority sectors territorial administration and security. This is justified by the occurrence of a new rebellion in 
the northern region of the country following a series of attempted coups d’Etat in 2005, and the question of flow 
of refugees from the Darfour region.   
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loan agreement.137 An independent dispute settlement mechanism would have certainly been 
in a good position to decide on the issue.  
 
4.4 CONCLUSION 
In sum, although the implementation of the World Bank’s governance conditionality has led 
to observable increase of the country’s GDP and GDP per capita, it remains that many 
changes are still awaited.138 From an institutional point of view, the Oil Control and 
Monitoring Group as well as the 5% Temporary Management Committee have not been 
proven to be highly effective.  
Moreover, the rigidity of the World Bank’s governance conditionality approach and the lack 
of an independent assessment and dispute settlement mechanism have increased the tension 
between the Chadian government and the World Bank, leading to a 6 months suspension of 
all disbursement of monies to Chad.139
As Krasner rightly pointed out, ‘the lesson of the Chad-Cameroon pipeline is that creating 
potent shared sovereignty institutions in weak states in the contemporary environment will be 
difficult.’140 Furthermore, the Chad-pipeline project reveals the limits of the World Bank 
approach to governance and the necessity to reform the model. 
 
 
 
                                                 
137 Press Releases No: 2006/227/AFR and No:2006/232/AFR  available at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:20778928~pagePK:64257043~piPK:4
37376~theSitePK:4607,00.html [accedded on 23 October 2006] 
138 See the decrease in the education index and the increase of the inflation rate as substantiated in this paper by 
the data of table 2.  
139 The disbursement of fund only resumed on July 13th following the signature of a Memorandum of 
Understanding between the tow parties. 
140 Krasner, Opcit, 1095. 
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CHAPTER 5 REFORM OF THE WORLD BANK APPROACH TO 
GOVERNANCE CONDITIONALITY. 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Three categories of proposals have been made in order to balance the Bank’s approach to 
governance conditionality and the sovereignty of the borrowing countries.  The first category 
is related to the Bank’s Articles of Agreements, the second to its governance structure and the 
third to the modus operandi of governance conditionality.141  
5.2  AMENDING THE BANK’S ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT 
As discussed in Chapter 2 of this paper, the Bank’s governance agenda remains controversial, 
because it is not expressly provided in the Articles of Agreement and most of all because it is 
contrary to Art IV of the Articles of Agreement which prevents the Bank from political 
activities and consideration in its lending operations.  
In view of the steadily expansion of the Bank’s mandate, 142 it is believed that the teleological 
interpretation suggested by the former legal counsel I. Shihata is no more relevant, and that 
the Bank should clearly recognize the political nature of governance, and address it in close 
cooperation with other international organizations with a strong experience such as the 
UNDP.143
Although such an amendment is necessary, because it legitimizes the Bank’s governance 
agenda, it remains that expanding the World Bank’s mandate raises the concern of the 
elasticity of the Bank’s Articles of Agreements.144 As Professor Michael Reisman rightly 
                                                 
141 This research does not examine the proposals aiming at ousting the Bank from the field of governance, 
because that will be naïve and unrealistic. 
142 The Bank is know playing the role of secretariat for the consultative meetings of various donor consortia, 
which stipulated what political conditions would need to be met Doornbos (2003) 11 and 12. See also Boon 
(2007), 513 and Ciorciari (1998) 292. 
143 The main argument is that the UNDP is mainly concerned with developement as a whole, and has a very long 
and strong experience in the field of governance. 
144 In fact such an amendment might open the door to an everlasting series of amendments due to the changing 
nature of the international system.  
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suggested, there is a limit to institutional elasticity; that is the extent to which institutions 
created can still used for other purposes.145
 
5.3  REFORMING THE WORLD BANK'S GOVERNANCE 
STRUCTURE 
The reform of the Banks’ governance structure is driven by the consideration that 
‘International Governmental Organizations’ strength and ultimately their influence rest on 
the legitimacy of their decision-making processes.’146 Two proposals will be presented. 
5.3.1 INCREASING THE REPRESENTATION OF DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE BOARD 
As it has been developed in the earlier chapter, developing countries, especially from Sub-
Saharan Africa, which for the large majority of the Bank’s borrowers, are underrepresented in 
the Board of Executive Directors. Since this non plenary organ is empowered with the tasks 
of adopting sound policies and principles that applied in the Bank’s lending operations, it is 
suggested that the composition of the Board of Executive Directors be reformed so as to 
enhance the presence of borrowing countries within the Board, since they are the main 
interested parties to loan agreements.147 Thus, the G24148 has suggested both an adjustment 
of the quota formula to include both a higher weighting for GDP and an increase in basic votes 
(at least a tripling) of developing countries. 149
                                                 
145 Quoted by Shihata Opcit, 564. 
146 Athena (2000) 9. 
147 Darrow (2003) 231. 
148 The G24 was founded in 1971 "to concert the position of developing countries on monetary and development 
finance issues". It is constituted of 24 countries from the three regions of Africa, Latin America and the 
Caribbean, and Asia 
149  This proposal, which was reiterated during the 2006 annual Meeting of the G 24 in singapore. Woods (2000)  
8 suggested an alternative: another (non-voting) seat on the Board for large constituencies;  an additional 
Alternate Executive-Director in the largest constituencies e.g. To deal with policy issues leaving the existing 
Alternate Director to deal with country issues. None of these proposals is supported by developed countries. 
They suggest a two approach formula (an ad hoc increase in quota votes for large emerging market countries 
(predominantly in Asia), with an eventual review of the quota formula). While a final consensus is still awaited 
between the country members, current system remains in force.  For the G24 2006 Meeting, see the  
Communiqué final available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEVCOMMINT/Documentation/21055935/DC2006-0020(E)-G24.pdf 
[accessed on March 27th 2007].  The proposal of developed countries is summarized in  ODI (2005) 2 sqq. 
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 Increasing developing countries’ representation in the Board of Executive Directors will 
provide them with the opportunity of raising their concerns, preoccupations, and constraints 
during the discussion over the type of conditionalities to be attached to the loans to be granted 
to them.  
Also, such an increase will increase their chances to influence the voting of the decisions, and 
enhance the legitimacy of the Bank’s policies. They which will no longer be considered as 
imposed from the outside. Ultimately this will influence borrowing countries’ compliance 
with the policies adopted; and as Franck Thomas correctly argued, “Nations obey rules when 
there is a perception that they or the institutions from which they emanate have very high 
degree of legitimacy.”150  
5.3.2 INSTITUTIONALIZING THE PARTICIPATION OF NON-STATE 
ACTORS IN THE MEETINGS OF THE EXECUTIVE BOARD 
This proposal is related to the participation of stakeholders other than the borrower’s 
Government, but which might be affected by the project funded and conditionalities attached 
to the loan, in the decision making process of the World Bank. The rationale behind the 
proposal is to provide private actors with the opportunity to participate in the discussion over 
the conditionalities to be included into a loan agreement that to which their Government is 
party to.151  
Head suggested for example that the World Bank, and other International Financial 
Institutions, should provide mechanisms for soliciting and considering comments from the 
public during a reasonable period of time, before decisions are made on proposed financing 
operations or on proposed policy statements or changes.152  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
150 Quoted by Darrow Ibid, 41. 
151 In addition, Wood (2005)19 suggested that parliaments should be engaged in debating conditions imposed 
through lending programmes, before programmes are finalized.  
152 Head (2004) 306 
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This proposal raises some concerns including the criteria to be used in granting locus standi 
to NGOs, the stage at which they will be admitted to intervene and the remedies at their 
disposal; they will be discussed in the last section of this paper. 
 
5.4 IMPROVING THE MODUS OPERANDI OF THE WORLD BANK. 
Three proposals have been made with regard to the modus operandi of the Bank’s governance 
conditionality, in order to streamline its use in the World Bank’s lending operations.   
5.4.1 FROM CONDITIONALITY TO SELECTIVITY 
It has appeared from chapter 4 that the implementation of the World Bank’s governance 
conditionality is the main source of tension between the Bank and borrowing countries, 
mostly because of its rigidity. The use of selectivity, which is supported by a large number of 
scholars,153 has been suggested in replacement of conditionality. The principles of selectivity 
poses that the World Bank, instead of wasting its efforts on those countries that are reluctant 
to reform, should rather concentrate on countries which already have a good governance 
score, and should grant loans to these countries without any conditions attached to it.154  
With regard to how the countries will be graded and classified, it is argued that the Bank will 
resort to the ICP colloquially known as the IDA Country’s Performance.155 After an 
assessment of the need of a country member, the Bank will then determine the allocation of 
available funds.156
The most outstanding merit of this proposal is the fact that it does constitute a step towards 
the abandon of conditionality in the Bank’s lending operations. Apart from that, the proposal 
seems to raise more concerns than it addresses.  
                                                 
153 Stiglitz (2002), Peet (2004), Wood (2005), Tsai Opcit 1329 
154  Tsai Opcit 1329.  
155 An ICP’s country is obtained by calculating a weighted average of the policy scorecard (80%) and the Bank 
rating of the preformance of the outstanding loans of that country. The weighted average is then multiplied by a 
governance related criteria in the scorecard.  
156 For a complete analysis of the World Bank’s country Performance Assessment Index, see Wood ibid, 21-24. 
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The first is the objectivity and reliability of an assessment that will be done by the Bank 
itself. Doubts have been expressed on the capability of the Bank to act as jury and judge of 
his own case.157  
Secondly, the standards and criteria to be used by the Bank. In fact, the policy scorecard is 
made up of 16 criteria including environment and governance. Therefore question is to 
whether the Bank will resort to its own criteria, or it will base its assessment on Reports from 
Specialized International Organizations, given their strong experience in their field.158  
Thirdly, it has been argued that the use of selectivity will lead to a new form of conditionality 
colloquially known as ex post conditionality,159 because the Bank will reward those countries 
that already implement its policies. 160 As a result, non-reforming countries, which are in 
most cases, those in need of funds, might be left by the wayside.161  
 
5.4.2 STRENGTHENING OF THE BORROWER’S OWNERSHIP 
One of the findings of the 1992 Wapenhaus Report, which assesses the quality of the World 
Bank’s loan portfolio, is that the Bank was more often concerned about getting as many 
projects as possible, with less attention being given to the degree of ownership assumed by 
the borrowers.162  
                                                 
157 A report on the "uses and abuses of governance indicators" from the OECD finds that problems associated 
with the CPIA's construction or use include: "i) the likelihood of correlation of errors among the 37 sources 
from which the composite World Bank Institute indicators are constructed, which significantly limits the 
statistical legitimacy of using them to compare countries' scores; ii) their lack of comparability over time; iii) 
sample bias; and iv) insufficient transparency." See <http://brettonwoodsproject.org/art.shtml?x=542375> 
[accessed on 27 May 2007]; See also Nanda (2006) 271 and 272. 
158 This is the case of the UNDP and the UN High Commission for Human Rights. For the moment, the Bank 
continue to navigate alone in its assessment’s exercice.  
159 Nanda (2006) 280. 
160 Also, relying on past performance to reward or sanction countries in not appropriate since past performance 
not constitute an effective indicator and guide to future performance. Hansen and Tarp quoted by Nanda, 
Ibidem.  
161 Checkel (2000) from <www.arena.uio.no/publications/wp00_18.htm>[accessed on 27 October 2006]. 
162 Also known as the approval culture; see The World Bank. (1992). Effectiveness implementation: Key to 
development impact (The Wapenhans Report). Washington, D.C.: The World Bank 
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Based on this finding, it has been suggested to pay more attention to ownership.163 The 
concept of ownership aims at giving the borrower a great role in the definition of reforms, so 
as to reflect its priorities. There is no doubt that this proposal might disentangle the tension 
between the Bank and its borrowers, since ownership will ultimately restores the sovereignty 
of the borrower in determining what sort of policies and programs it should apply in pursue 
of its development.164   
However, there is no consensus between borrowers and the Bank on what is ownership. As 
Wood correctly argued, ‘for NGOs and Third World countries, ownership implies that there 
should be country-wide agreement of policy reforms. IFIs tend to take a more narrow 
approach: They define ownership in terms of whether or not the government agrees with and 
is willing to implement a proposed reform.’165  
Furthermore, while International Financial Institutions persistently argue that ownership is 
compatible with conditionality, NGOs and borrowers share the view that the two are 
incompatible, and that any attempt to associate the two concepts will only lead to a new form 
of conditionality described as conditionality with imperfect ownership.166
5.4.3 ADOPTING A STRONG MONITORING MECHANISM. 
It has been shown in Chapter 4 of this paper that due to its administrative character, its 
mandate and the nature of its decisions, the Inspection Panel is not appropriate to address all 
the issues related to the monitoring of the Bank’s funded projects. Henceforth, the idea of an 
independent and strong monitoring mechanism has resurfaced.167 Cahn is of the view that 
there should be an independent institution located outside the Bank or a watchdog agency 
                                                 
163 Santiso (2001) 19. See also the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, Ownership, Harmonization, 
alignment, Results and Mutual Accountability, 2005, Parag. 16 <www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/41/34428351.pdf > 
[accessed on 24th  March 2007]. 
164 Nanda (2006) 280.  
165 Wood (2005) 9. 
166 Ibidem.   
167 In fact, already before the creation of the Inspection Panel, a coalition of NGOs led by the Natural Resources 
Defense Council and the Centre for Environmental Law suggested the creation of an Independent Appeal 
Commission made of 9 members with jurisdiction to investigate complains from any member country or 
individual and NGOs in developing countries related to the Bank’s policies, procedures, loans and credit 
agreements. Bradlow, D.D suggested the creation of an Ombusdman with a mandate to investigate and respond 
to conflicts relating to staffs implementation of the Bank’s operating rules and procedures, as well as 
administrative practices. See I Shihata (1994) 24. 
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insulated from conflicts of interests inherent in the Bank’s multiple role.168 Head went further 
to suggest the creation of an International Tribunal for Multilateral Banks will have the power 
to supervise and oversee the implementation of the Bank funded projects, investigate on 
administrative matters and will have appellate jurisdiction over the governing Boards in 
matters of Charter’s interpretations.169  
There is little doubt that these proposals will reduce likelihood of the tension between the 
Bank and Borrowers over the interpretation of the loans’ provisions, since the new 
mechanism will act as a neutral institution. In the case of the Chad pipeline Project for 
example, the issue at the root of the suspension by the Bank of all disbursement of monies to 
Chad was whether or not the amendment by the Chadian Government of the modality of 
allocation of its oil revenue was likely to materially and adversely affect the implementation 
of the Program.170  
It is believed that the existence of a competent and independent institution will have been in a 
better position to address the issue.171 Nevertheless, it is not clear from Head’s proposal how 
the tribunal will operate in practice.   
5.5 ASSESSING THE EXISTING PROPOSALS  
Starting with the reform of the World Bank’s governance structure. There is no doubt that an 
increase of the participation of developing countries especially the main borrowers within the 
decision-making institutions is most likely to affect their with regard to the legitimacy of the 
decision making process.  
However, this can only be possible if the increase affects the number and weight of 
borrowing countries’ votes, as suggested by the G24.  This reform seems to be hardly 
                                                 
168 This is because there are many instances where the Bank acts as Development Agency, lending institution, 
debt collector and representative of developed countries interests. See Cahn (1993) 159. 
169 Head (2004) 311. According to him, Judges for the tribunal could be selected by the MDBs themselves-
perhaps two nominated by each participating MDB and two by the President of the International Court of 
Justice. 
170 For the Chadian authorities the modifications were driven by the need take into consideration the changes 
and new preoccupation of the country. For the Bank the changes were likely to materially and adversely affect 
the implementation of the project. See Press Release No: 2006/227/AFR available at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:20771610~pagePK:34370~piPK:3442
4~theSitePK:4607,00.html. [accedded on 23 October 2006] 
171 As Bruculeri (2004) 79 correctly argued that, a strong and independent monitoring and dispute settlement 
mechanism will provide effective remedies when violations of the Banks mandate are found. 
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achievable, at least in the short and medium term, because instead of supporting the idea that 
the GDP should be the main criteria in allocating the votes in the Bank’s Executive Board, 
the current dominant power share another view, which will only benefit emerging developing 
countries.172  Thus, it is believed that the reform will be rejected because of the lack of the 
qualified majority within the Bank’s Executive Board. 173  
Concerning the participation of private actors to the discussion over the conditionalities and 
policy reforms to be included in a loan agreement involving their country, there is no doubt 
that it might increase the level of ownership.174 However, the question remains as to whether 
the Board will be bound by the requests, and whether there will be the possibility to appeal 
the decision of the Board. In addition the participation can only be possible if the discussions 
are held at the domestic level, given the financial constraints faced by many Southern 
NGOs.175 Finally there is the impact of the participation of private actors on the efficacy of 
the decision making process within the Executive Board. In effect, the probability that the 
Executive Board be flooded with requests from a plethora of NGOs is very high and some 
government might be severely affected. 
With regard to the proposal aiming at the creation of a strong and independent monitoring 
and dispute settlement body, it is not disputed that this will provide the Bank and Borrowers 
with neutral assessment and solutions to any problems arisen from the implementation of the 
Bank’s policies, such as the interpretation of specific provisions of the loan agreement 
between the two parties as it was the case in the Chad pipeline project.  
                                                 
172 As developed earlier, they suggest a two approach formula (an ad hoc increase in quota votes for large 
emerging market countries (predominantly in Asia), with an eventual review of the quota formula). These 
countries do not depend any longer on the Bank’s programs like African one; and consequently, are not affected 
by its effects. See  ODI Opcit 2 sqq 
173 Art V, Sec 4 (f) of the of the IBRD Articles of Agreement provides that ‘a quorum for any meeting of the 
Executive Directors shall be a majority of the Directors, exercising not less than one-half of the total voting 
power.’ the same majority is required for the adoption of any decisions within the Executive Board of the Bank.  
This situation, already detrimental to borrowing countries, is aggravated by the option left by Art.V, Sec.5 (a) 
which states: ‘The President shall be Chairman of the Executive Directors, but shall have no vote except a 
deciding vote in case of an equal division.’ Since in practice the President of the Bank has always been 
appointed by the USA, there is little doubt that in case of equal division, he will vote against the USA position. 
174 Private actors will not only raise their concerns and preoccupations; but also, they will be aware of the 
challenges they will be exposed to during the implementation of the program.   
175 In fact there is a risk that this proposal might result in a new imbalance between imbalance between NGOs 
from the South and those from the North in the Bank’s decision making bodies. 
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However given it is not clear whether IFIs will accept to surrender their autonomy to a third 
party Institution. In fact, the current competition among these International Financial 
Institution lead to the conclusion that they will rather opt for refined internal monitoring 
institutions.  
5.6 CONCLUSION 
It appears from the above description that the legitimacy of both the decision making process 
and its outcomes remain questioned and need to be reformed.  It is believed that this will 
disentangle the tension between the Bank and borrowing countries, lead to a close 
cooperation between the two parties for the effectiveness of the loans granted. As Thomas 
Franck rightly posited, there is an inextricably relationship between the legitimacy of an 
international rule or standard and its effectiveness.176  
Although the problems are clearly identified, many divergences still exist between the 
stakeholders: there is no consensus between the current main shareholders and borrowing 
countries over the reform of the Executive Board; the Bank considers that it should be the one 
determining the meaning and content of ownership. Borrowing countries want to fully 
exercise their sovereign rights over their economics policies; and NGOs are struggling to 
become key actors of the whole process.   
At the same time, there is more and more doubt over the relevance of the Bank. As the 
Meltzer Report clearly indicated, the World Bank, despite its activism, has not succeeded in 
reducing poverty all over developing countries.177 The Bank is now facing the hard 
competition of alternative means of international financing mechanisms both at and 
multilateral level and at the bilateral level. More and more, African countries for example 
have the tendency to resort to China for bilateral loans, which have little strings attached to 
them.178  
                                                 
176 Quoted by Darrow, Opcit, 76. 
177 Meltzer (2000) 17 
178 Most Asian and Latin American countries which were the big borrower of the Bank during the years 1970s 
are no longer demanding countries. 
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All these preoccupations show render urgent a reform of the World Bank so as to redistribute 
decision making power along more democratic and equitable lines, having in mind the impact 
of decisions.179
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
179 Darrow Opcit 208.  
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CHAPTER 6 RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The ensuing discussion deals with three main recommendations, aiming at enhancing the 
effectiveness of international loans and grants while safeguarding borrowing countries’ 
sovereignty. They are suited for short and medium term implementation and consist of: 
adoption of principles applicable to the World Bank’s loans and grants, transformation of the 
Inspection Panel into an independent monitoring and dispute settlement mechanism and 
improving the participation of borrowing countries in the Executive Board on issues affecting 
them. The chapter ends with an analysis of the benefits and cost attached to the 
recommendations and a general conclusion. 
6.2 ADOPTION OF PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO THE BANK’S 
LOAN AND GRANTS. 
It has appeared throughout this research that there is no unanimity between the borrowers and 
the Bank upon the standards upon which the Bank’s governance package should be modeled. 
Also, it has been evidenced that the current governance agenda was driven by the economic 
philosophy of major shareholders of the World Bank, resulting in programs and reforms 
perceived as illegitimate. 
In order to reverse this situation and avoid any kind of subjectivity, this paper recommends 
the adoption of principles applicable to the World Bank's loans and grants. The idea is to 
come up with principles which will receive a wide support from all the Bank’s members.  
Head suggested that these principles should consist of Human Rights, Good governance, 
Environment and Labor principles already adopted (or which will be adopted) within existing 
Specialized International Organizations and individually ratified by a 2/3 majority of the 
Bank’s members. 180 These principles will then automatically become part of the Bank’s 
                                                 
180 Head (2004) 312. In addition, every time an international principle will be developed within a Specialized 
International Organization and ratified individually by a 2/3 majority of the Bank’ Members, that principle will 
automatically become applicable to the Bank’s lending programs.  
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legislation. They will be applicable to all the World Bank’s State Member, and all 
Multinational Company engaged in a project funded by the Bank.181  
In practice any potential borrowing country seeking a grant or loan will provide the Bank 
with a Memorandum of Understanding, describing how it intents to translate the principles 
into a program of action during the realization of the project for which the loan or grant is 
requested.182  
Three main advantages are attached to this recommendation:  
First, the Bank will not longer have to decide on additional obligations in terms of policies 
reforms to impose on potential borrowers. Rather it will limit itself to examine the 
Memorandum of Understanding and appreciate how the borrower intends to give effect to the 
applicable principles in the realization’s process of the project to be funded. Thus the issue as 
legitimacy of the reforms attached to the Bank’s lending operations will be addressed, since 
all the Bank’s members will have participated in their elaboration.183
Secondly, this recommendation will increase predictability in the use of governance and other 
principles. In effect any State approaching the Bank for a loan will always know in advance 
the principles that will apply to its case, since these principles will always consist of those 
which have been ratified by member States and in force prior to the loan’s request.  
Thirdly, from the standpoint of the general theory of law, it is believed that this 
recommendation will restore the unity of international law governing identical issues, 
because the principles applicable to the Bank’s loans will not be different from those applied 
by the UNDP on governance issues, or those applied by the UNHCHR in relation to Human 
Rights. Moreover, this will favor the cooperation between International organizations, 
prevent any duplication of activities and foster the reform of the whole UN System.184
                                                 
181 Head (2004) 312. In addition, every time an international principle will be developed within a Specialized 
International Organization and ratified individually by a 2/3 majority of the Bank’ Members, that principle will 
automatically become applicable to the Bank’s lending programs.  
182 The Memorandum of Understanding, which will be a covenant to the loan agreement, will also determine the 
sequencing of the chosen reforms and the indicators of progress so as to facilitate the assessment of the Project 
by the Monitoring Mechanism. 
183 This argument is also based on the fact that most UN Specialized Agencies apply the principle one State-one 
Vote.  
184 Darrow Opcit 280. 
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6.3  TRANSFORMING THE INSPECTION PANEL INTO AN 
INDEPENDENT MONITORING AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
MECHANISM.  
As noted in the earlier chapter, the mandate of the current Inspection Panel is very narrow 
and its autonomy restricted. Even the creation of the International Advisory Group in the 
present case study has been proven to be less effective than expected.185  
Since the proposals made so far have not attracted enough support,186 this paper recommends 
the transformation of the existing Inspection Panel into an independent monitoring and 
dispute settlement mechanism. The members will be nominated by the board of governors on 
a regional basis;187 and their decisions, like those of the International Court of Justice will be 
final.  In addition to the investigatory activities,188 the new Panel will address all disputes 
arisen between the Bank and its borrowers over the interpretation of any provision of loan 
agreements. 
In order to increase the effectiveness of the monitoring process, it is suggested that the new 
Panel acts on the basis of Reports issued by both the local Bureau of the Bank and other 
Technical International and Regional Organizations, so as to come up with a position 
reflecting the reality of the field.189  
 
                                                 
185 The reason underlining this ineffectiveness are developed in Section 4.3.3 of Chapter 4 of this paper. 
186 These are mainly the creation of an Ombusdman or an International Tribunal for Multilateral Developments 
Banks. 
187 Each region will appoint one candidate, and the President will be designated by the nominated judges. 
188 These refer to the activities already carried out by the current Inspection Panel. 
189 The idea here is to take into consideration the technical nature of some of the issues. Henceforth, on 
economical issues, Reports issued by the national representation of the World Bank, will be given full 
consideration, meanwhile on issues such as governance, environment and human rights, the Panel will give 
consideration to Reports emanating for example from the local bureau of the United Nations Development 
Program National Bureau and Regional Organization, the NEPAD, the World Wild Fund  
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6.4 IMPROVING THE REPRESENTATION OF BORROWING 
COUNTRIES TO THE EXECUTIVE BOARD MEETING AFECTING 
THEM.  
This proposal stands as an alternative to the reform of the voting system within the Bank’s 
Executive Board. In fact, it has been rightly alleged by Wood that any reform aiming at 
changing the weight vote system will be difficult to achieve.190 The reason is that since such 
a change requires the approval of a 60% majority of the membership having a total of 85% of 
the voting power, countries such as the USA will be reluctant to vote for it. 
This paper therefore recommends that borrowing countries entering into a loan agreement 
with the Bank, automatically participates to all the meeting and discussion of the Executive 
Board related to their request; on such an occasion, they will be granted an ad hoc vote during 
the adoption of the final decision.  
Through this recommendation, borrowers will be granted the opportunity not only to raise 
their voice during the debate over the content of the loan agreement; but most of all, to 
oppose through their vote the adoption of any loan or grant that does not meet their 
expectations. It is believed that the improvement of their representation in the Executive 
Board will ultimately enhance the legitimacy of the Bank’s programs. 
6.6 POTENTIAL BENEFITS AND COST ATTACHED TO THE 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.6.1 POTENTIAL BENEFITS 
Starting with the principles applicable to the Bank’s loans and grants. It is believed that the 
adoption of such principles will bring clarity and objectivity in the World Bank’s lending 
programs; since any borrower will know in advance the standards that will apply to its 
situation if the funds were ultimately released. In addition, since these the principles are in 
those adopted within the framework of International Organizations that apply the rule of 
sovereign equality among their member States during their decision making process, it is 
                                                 
190 Quoted by Darrow (2003) 226. The reason is that since such a change requires the approval of a 60% 
majority of the membership having a total of 85% of the voting power, countries such as the USA will be 
reluctant to vote for it. 
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believed that the principles applicable to the Bank’s lending operations will almost reflect the 
consensus among the members of the international community.  
Secondly, the recommendation related to the Memorandum of Understanding is most likely 
to safeguard the interests of both the borrower who is the initiator of the Document and the 
lender, since the Bank’s Executive Directors will always have the opportunity to assess the 
Document. It will thus make sure that the proposed Memorandum of Understanding is not 
merely a catalog of good intentions, but most of all, that it contains clear indicators of 
progress and a detailed timing of the program.  
With regard to transformation of the Inspection Panel into an independent monitoring and 
dispute settlement mechanism, it is assumed that the enlargement of its mandate to issues of 
interpretation of the provisions of loan’s agreement and settlement of dispute between the 
Bank and the borrower will constitute a tool to disentangle the tension between the two 
parties. Finally it is believed that the cooperation between the Bank and other technical 
International and Regional Organization, which is provided by Art. 5 of the Agreement 
between the World Bank and the UN191 will mark an end to the competition among 
international organization and rationalize their actions.  
6.6.2 PROSPECTIVE COSTS 
The first and main impediment to these recommendations is related to the independence of 
the Bank. In fact, Art 1, sec 2 of the Agreement between the World Bank and the UN clearly 
states that:  
 ‘By reason of the nature of its international responsibilities, and the terms of its 
articles of agreements, the Bank is, and is required to function as, an independent 
International Organization.’ 192
                                                 
191 This article provides for cooperation between the World Bank and others UN agencies in the following terms: 
‘The Bank recognizes that the United Nations and its organs may appropriately make recommendations with 
respect to the technical aspect of reconstruction or development plans, programs or project. 
192 See Art 1, Para 2 of the Agreement between the IBRD and the UN adopted by Resolution 92 V of August 16, 
1947 of the United Nations Economic and Social Council and approved by Resolution 124 II of November 15, 
1947. From <daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/038/31/IMG/NR003831.pdf?OpenElement> 
[accessed on 12 February 2007]. 
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The question is therefore whether the creation of an independent and monitoring and dispute 
settlement mechanism outside of the Bank current structure will not constitute a hindrance to 
its independence. This question is justified by the recommendation made in this paper that the 
newly created Panel bases its assessment on Reports issued by other International and 
regional Organizations.  There is the fear that cases of conflict between one of these 
Organizations and the Bank on specific issues might arise, and this might put the Panel into a 
difficult position. 
The second is impediment is the financial cost of the reform, especially with the 
transformation of the existing Inspection Panel. In fact this will require new personnel and 
the number of panelists will increase, since each geographical region will have one the right 
to appoint one candidate. Nevetherless, it is assumed that since this will be a transformation 
of an existing institution, the financial cost will not be an obstacle. In addition it is alleged 
that the objective of enhancing the effectiveness of the Bank’s lending operations and 
improving the relationship between the Bank and borrowing countries should be prefered 
notwithstanding the cost attached to the pursue of such an objective, rather than a stationary 
situation which will have no financial incidence at all.    
 
6.7 GENERAL CONCLUSION 
The debate over the effectiveness of the World Bank lending operations will continue to 
passionate not only the borrowers and donors, but also the affected populations, scholars and 
the Bank’s officials.  The aim of this paper was to bring some light on some of the causes of 
such relative effectiveness, through the example of the Chad-IBRD loan agreement for the 
construction of the Chad-Cameroon pipeline.  
The research has revealed that: 
• The composition of the World Bank’s governance structure and decision making 
process leading to the definition of the Bank’s governance conditionality is 
detrimental to borrowers. As result, the Bank’s governance reform programs are 
perceived by borrowers as illegitimate.  
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• The implementation of loan including a governance conditionality component leaves 
little room to the borrower sovereignty to freely amend the programs so as to adapt 
them to new changes, and ultimately, increases the tension between the Bank and the 
borrower. This is aggravated by the lack of an independent and strong monitoring and 
dispute settlement mechanism. 
Owing to the practical difficulties attached to the existing reform’s proposals, this paper 
suggests a new model, which might enhance the effectiveness of the Bank’s lending 
programs while safeguarding the sovereignty of borrower. The model is built on four 
cornerstones: the principles applicable to all the Bank’s lending activities, the Memorandum 
of Understanding, the new assessment and monitoring mechanism, and a new mode of 
representation of borrowing countries within the World Bank’s governance bodies. 
It should be underlined that these short and mid-term recommendations can not be considered 
without addressing the structural issues within the Bank, and upon which any policy 
implementation ultimately depends. Some of these issues include the deficit in accountability 
both internally (vertically) and externally (horizontally) and the lack of transparency.193  The 
way these challenges will be address will certainly affect the behavior of member countries, 
because the Bank will be preaching good governance not only in words, but also in acts.  
Also, given the multiplication frameworks through which Aid is now channeled, the 
cooperation between the International Financial Institutions participating in those initiatives 
has to be formalized.194 At this level, the on going reform of the United Nations Economic 
and Social Council might be of great importance so as to empower it to coordinate the 
activities of all those Institutions. These issues are not within the ambit of this thesis but 
constitute an off short which is however connected. 
 
 
 
                                                 
193 Darrow (2003) 222.  
194 See for example the new Aid for trade program developed within the framework of the World Trade 
Organization.  
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ANNEX 1 
SCHEDULE 5of the Chad-IBRD loan Agreement 
Petroleum Revenue Management Program 
1. General Objective. The objective of the Petroleum Revenue Management Program (the 
Program) is to assist in reducing poverty in the territory of the Borrower. To that end, it 
contemplates the set aside of the petroleum revenues received by the Borrower under the 
Project and to target their use to priority poverty sectors in the context of the Borrower’s 
overall sectoral programs and global government expenditure patterns, and in a manner 
consistent with sound macro-economic management. For the purposes of this Schedule, the 
term “Petroleum Revenues” shall consist of amounts (net of the amounts due by the Borrower 
to the Bank and EIB under this Agreement and the EIB Finance Contract, respectively) to be 
received by the Borrower under the Project as follows: 
(a) Royalties (the Royalties) due to the Borrower under the Upstream Convention; 
(b) Dividends (the Dividends) received by the Borrower as shareholder, respectively, of 
COTCO and TOTCO; and 
(c) Taxes (the Taxes) levied on TOTCO, CHEVRON CHAD, ESSO CHAD and PETRONAS 
CHAD income. 
2. Petroleum Revenue Management Law. As part of the Program, the Borrower agrees that 
Law No. 0001/PR/99 dated January 11, 1999, governing the management of the petroleum 
revenues (the Petroleum Revenue Management Law) shall not be amended or waived so as to 
materially and adversely affect the implementation of the Program. 
3. Flow of Funds. The Borrower shall cause the Petroleum Revenues to be paid by any entity 
which has payment obligations to the Borrower in relation to the Project (the Obligors) into 
the Escrow Accounts. The Borrower shall, subject to its obligations under Article II of this 
Agreement and its financial obligations under the EIB Finance Contract, cause the proceeds 
of the Escrow Accounts to be distributed as follows: 
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(a) 10 percent of the Royalties and Dividends shall promptly be deposited and invested in 
long-term investment instruments with a financial institution, satisfactory to the Bank (the 
Future Generations Fund); 
(b) 90 percent of the Royalties and Dividends shall be deposited in special accounts in one or 
more private commercial banks in Chad, satisfactory to the Bank (the Special Petroleum 
Revenue Accounts), in the name of the Borrower’s Treasury; and  
 (c) the Taxes shall be paid directly from the Escrow Accounts to the Borrower’s Treasury.  
4. Use of Funds 
(a) Moneys deposited in the Future Generations Fund shall be invested, under prudential rules 
and investment arrangements satisfactory to the Bank, in long-term investment instruments. 
Upon their liquidation, the proceeds of such investments shall be used to benefit poverty 
reduction objectives. The Borrower shall adopt not later than December 31, 2001, such 
prudential rules and investment arrangements satisfactory to the Bank, as amended from time 
to time in substance satisfactory to the Bank. 
(b) Moneys deposited in the Special Petroleum Revenue Accounts shall be allocated as 
follows: 
(i)  80 percent of Royalties and 85% of the Dividends shall be allocated to expenditures, 
acceptable to the Bank, for the following priority poverty reduction sectors in support of the 
Borrower’s objective of regional balance: health and social affairs, education, infrastructure, 
rural development (agriculture and livestock) and environment and water resources. 
(ii)  Expenditures to be financed with the Royalties and Dividends referred to in 
paragraph 4 (b) (i) above in these priority poverty reduction sectors shall be incremental to 
expenditures reflected in the Borrower’s budget for fiscal year 2002 in respect of these 
sectors. 
(iii)  5 percent of Royalties shall be allocated to decentralized authorities in the petroleum 
producing region (as defined below), as a supplement to the allocation referred to in 
paragraph 4 (b) (i) above, to finance expenditures, acceptable to the Bank, to reduce poverty. 
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For purposes of this paragraph, “petrole um producing region” means the area within the 
boundaries delineated in the map attached to this Schedule 5. 
 
(iv)  Up to and including December 31, 2007, 15 percent of Royalties and Dividends can 
be used to finance general recurrent expenditures for the non “Sovereign” sectors. After 
December 31, 2007, this portion shall be used to finance expenditures in priority poverty 
reduction sectors referred to in paragraph 4 (b) (i) above in accordance with the same terms 
and conditions applicable to expenditures under such paragraph (including those set out in 
paragraphs (5), (6) and (7) below). 
(c) The Taxes shall be used to finance increased development expenditures generally. 
5. Modalities 
(a) The following modalities shall apply in respect of expenditures under paragraph 4 (b) (i) 
above: 
(i) By not later than September 15 each year, the Borrower shall prepare a plan 
satisfactory to the Bank containing the detailed allocation of resources under paragraph 4 (b) 
(i) from the Special Petroleum Revenue Accounts to the priority poverty reduction sectors 
referred to in such paragraph; such annual expenditure program shall be reflected in the draft 
Borrower’s budget to be submitted annually for approval to the Borrower’s Parliament. 
(ii)  In accordance with Article 18 of the Petroleum Revenue Management Law, the 
independent “Collège de Contrôle et de Surveillance des Ressources Pétrolières” (CCSRP) 
shall authorize and verify the disbursements from the Special Petroleum Revenue Accounts. 
(iii)  Amounts under paragraph 4 (b) (i) above which cannot be used for the agreed 
objectives, or the use of which would jeopardize the Borrower’s macroeconomic stability, 
shall be held in the Special Petroleum Revenue Accounts, under arrangements to be agreed 
upon by the Bank, for their subsequent use in financing priority poverty reduction sectors 
referred to in paragraph 4 (b) (i) above. 
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(b) The Borrower shall develop, not later than January 31, 2003, record keeping, auditing and 
distribution mechanisms acceptable to the Bank regarding the distribution and application of 
funds pursuant to paragraph 4 (b) (iii), including by the decentralized authorities. 
 
6. Public expenditure reviews The Borrower shall conduct with the Bank, under terms of 
reference acceptable to the Bank, annual public expenditure reviews (with a particular focus 
on the use of Petroleum Revenues). 
7. Record-keeping, Reporting and Audits 
(a) The Borrower shall require the financial institution referred to in paragraph 3 (a) above 
and the commercial banks referred to in paragraph 3 (b) above, to maintain records and 
accounts adequate to reflect, in accordance with sound accounting practices, the operations 
and financial condition of the Special Petroleum Revenue Accounts and the Future 
Generations Fund, respectively. 
(b) The Borrower shall: 
(i) require the financial institution and the commercial banks referred to in the preceding 
paragraph to have the records, accounts and financial statements (balance sheets, statements 
of income and expenses and related statements) for the Special Petroleum Revenue Accounts 
and the Future Generations Fund, respectively, for each fiscal year audited, in accordance 
with appropriate auditing principles consistently applied, by independent auditors acceptable 
to the Bank, under terms of reference satisfactory to the Bank; 
(ii)  furnish to the Bank as soon as available, but in any case not later than three (3) 
months after the end of each such year: (A) certified copies of the financial statements for 
such year as so audited; and (B) the report of such audits by said auditors of such scope and 
in such detail as the Bank shall have reasonably requested; and 
(iii)  furnish to the Bank such other information concerning said records, accounts and 
financial statements as well as the audits thereof, as the Bank shall from time to time 
reasonably request. 
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(c) The Borrower shall require such financial institution and commercial banks to issue, 
under terms of reference satisfactory to the Bank, quarterly reports regarding the management 
of the Future Generations Fund and the Special Petroleum Revenue Accounts, respectively, 
which the Borrower shall furnish to the Bank as soon as available. 
 
(d) The Borrower shall furnish to the Bank as soon as available certified copies of any reports 
issued by “Commission Bancaire de l’Afrique Centrale” (COBAC) regarding the private 
commercial banks referred to in paragraph 3 (b ) above. 
(e) The Borrower shall require CCSRP to issue, under terms of reference satisfactory to the 
Bank, quarterly reports regarding its activities, which the Borrower shall furnish to the Bank 
as soon as available. 
(f) The Borrower shall furnish to the Bank as soon as available certified copies of the audit 
report of the General Auditor’s Office regarding the execution of the Borrower’s annual 
budgets. 
(g) The Borrower shall, in accordance with Article 22 of the Petroleum Revenue 
Management Law, publish the reports and audits referred to in paragraphs 7 (b) (i), 7 (c), 7 
(e) and 7 (f) above. 
8. The Borrower shall issue by not later than December 31, 2001, all the necessary 
implementation decrees, satisfactory to the Bank, relating to the Petroleum Revenue 
Management Law including the decree regarding CCSRP, referred to in Article 19 of the 
Petroleum Revenue Management Law. 
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